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History

The Territorial Governor as Ex-officio
Superintendent of Indian Affairs and the
Decline of American-Indian Relationships (135 pp.)
Director: Michael S. Mayer

This thesis examines the role of territorial governors as
ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs and the
negative consequences combining the two offices had on
Indians, particularly in Montana Territory from 1864-1873.
The federal government combined the two territorial
offices because it saved the United States Government money,
but this created a conflict of interest. Effective
territorial governors promoted their territories to
encourage settlement, development, and, ultimately,
statehood. However, development led to white encroachment
on Indian lands and rights. Thus, the tasks of
administrating white men's affairs while maintaining the
rights of Indians often came into conflict. Self-interest
dictated that the governor concentrate on his role as
territorial governor, since the potential rewards for doing
so, such as a seat in the U.S. Senate, were both obvious and
greater. The accomplishment of their objectives as
governors worked to the detriment of their responsibilities
as ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs. They
therefore either neglected the latter office or used the
position to achieve wealth (though stealing) or fame
(through military action against their charges.
The experience of Montana's territorial governors as exof f icio superintendents of Indian affairs provides an
insight into the problem of territorial governors serving as
superintendents of Indian affairs. The contradiction in
duties between the two offices made it virtually impossible
adequately to fulfill the obligations Indian superintendent.
This explains why even conscientious territorial governors
failed in that regard. The problems, however, ran deeper
than changes in administrative policy could ever solve.
Even the attempted structural reforms in the office of
superintendent of Indian affairs failed to address the basic
problem. The tragedy of United States-Indian relations
transcended any adjustment in administrative practice.
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CHAPTER I
THE TERRITORIAL GOVERNOR
AS EX—OFFICIO SUPERINTENDENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN-INDIAN RELATIONS:
MONTANA TERRITORY, 1864-1866

Montana's first two Territorial Governors, Sidney
Edgerton and Green Clay Smith, also served as the ex-officio
Superintendents of Indian Affairs for the Montana
Superintendency.

It was not unusual to combine these two

different offices into one position.

Since the Republic's

beginnings, the United States Congress, through law and
practice, had combined these two different administrative
positions, with conflicting interests, into one office with
uneven results.

In Montana Territory, however, the practice

proved particularly disastrous to the preservation of
peaceful tribal relations; local politics defeated common
sense and duty.
Thus, when Sidney Edgerton accepted the territorial
governorship on June 22, 1864, he also assumed the position
and duties associated with being ex-officio Superintendent
of Indian Affairs for Montana Territory.1

Edgerton, and

1The practice of designating whoever held the office of
governor as superintendent of Indian affairs, or ex-officio
superintendent of Indian affairs, can be traced back to
September 11, 1789, when Congress authorized the payment of
$2,000 annual salary to the governor of the Northwest
Territory in compensation for his duties rendered as Indian

1

2
the other individuals who served simultaneously as
territorial governors and ex-officio superintendents of
Indian affairs, often found themselves unable to reconcile
their contrary positions when they performed their
"official" duties.

The practice of employing one man to

hold the offices of territorial governor and Indian
superintendent represented a conflict of interests which
Congress overlooked.

When a member of a federal Indian

treaty commission, a successful territorial governor signed
treaties that gained title to tribal lands.
could then be opened up to white settlement.

These lands
A territorial

governor measured his ultimate success when his territory
achieved statehood, whereas an Indian superintendent
measured his success when he insured the assimilation of
native tribesmen into the dominant white society while
preserving peace between the tribesmen and frontiersmen.
Under this ideal scenario, these administrative objectives

superintendent. See U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 1, (July 4,
1776—March 2, 1799), "An Act for establishing the Salaries of
the Executive Officers of the Government with their Assistants
and Clerks," p. 68.
This practice was continued through the
time Montana Territory was created. Section 2 of the Montana
Territory Enabling Act stated, "The Governor shall reside
within said territory, and shall be commander-in-chief of the
militia and superintendent of Indian affairs thereof." See
Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative
Years, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962) p.
52, and U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 13, (December 1863 —
December 1865), "An Act to provide a temporary government for
the Territory of Montana," 26 May 1864.

3
were not mutually exclusive.
territory became a state.

Both would be achieved when a

By that time, the tribesmen were

to have relinquished their hunter/gatherer or farmer/fisher
lifestyles or been removed to another territory.

In theory,

once Indians had turned away from their hunter/gather
lifestyle, they become assimilated and joined the local
communities as citizens.

With the assimilation of the

tribesmen, the need for a superintendent of Indian Affairs
would vanish.
The federal government combined the two territorial
offices because it saved the United States Government money.
This short term thinking meant that one territorial
official, had responsibility for two dichotomous frontier
issues.

The root of the conflict between the two offices

lay in the conflict between whites and tribesmen over
possession or use of land.

Effective territorial governors

promoted, or boosted, their territories to encourage
settlement, development, and, ultimately, statehood.
Boosterism, however, did not preserve peaceful relations
with local tribal communities.

Development eventually led

to white encroachment on Indian lands and rights.

Thus, the

tasks of administrating white men's affairs while
maintaining the rights of Indians often came into conflict.
Self-interest dictated that the governor concentrate on his
role as territorial governor, since the potential rewards

4
for doing so, such as a seat in the U.S. Senate, were both
obvious and greater.

The accomplishment of their objectives

as governor worked to the detriment of their
responsibilities as ex-officio superintendents of Indian
affairs.2

They therefore either neglected the latter

office or used the position to achieve wealth (though
stealing) or fame (through military action against their
charges.3
The literature concerning the governance of Western
Territories, and the Montana Territory in particular, has
focused on particular politics and organization of
territorial legislatures.

It has paid little attention to

the territorial governor's role as superintendent of Indian
affairs.

On the other hand, studies of Montana's

reservation communities during the territorial period have
concentrated on the agent/tribesmen relationship and either
ignored, or deliberately failed to examine, the territorial

2Robert

M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American
West; 1846-1890 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1984) p. 41.
3For

a discussion of the conflicts between politics and
Indian affairs see Earl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the
United States: 1861-1890 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1947) and William M. Neil "The Territorial
Governor as Indian Superintendent in the Trans-Mississippi
West" The Mississippi Valley Historical Review Vol. 43, No. 2,
(September 1956)

5
governor's role as head of Indian affairs.4

As a result,

the literature has failed adequately to examine the role of
Indian affairs in territorial politics.

In a situation

where the territory's leading politician also served as the
official United States representative for Indian affairs,
the two were inextricably interwoven.

In addition,

historians have failed to address the issue of the
territorial boundaries also serving as an Indian
superintendency and the territorial governor becoming an exofficio superintendent of Indian affairs by virtue of
holding territorial gubernatorial office.5
An unofficial criterion for a territory's transition to
statehood required the establishment of a modicum of law,

4Studies

of agencies during the Montana Territorial
period also fail to analyze the role of the Territorial
Governor as a mid-level bureaucrat in the Indian service. For
example, see John C. Ewers, The Blackfeet: Raiders on the
Northwest Plains, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1976.)
5Standard

studies of Montana Territorial history simply
do not provide an analysis of the governor as ex-officio
superintendent of Indian affairs.
The standard works
consulted that follow this pattern of neglect include Clark C.
Spence, Territorial Politics and Government in Montana, 186489 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), Michael P.
Malone and Richard B. Roeder, Montana: A History of Two
Centuries (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), K.
Ross Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1959, and James McClellan Hamilton, From
Wilderness to Statehood: A History of Montana 1805-1900
(Portland, OR: Binfords and Mont, 1957. One short article
that does provide some insight is William M. Neil, "The
Territorial Governor as Indian Superintendent."
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order, and civilization within the territory's boundaries.
The territorial governor, charged with grooming his
territory for eventual statehood, discovered that one of the
main obstacles he faced was the problem of imagined or real
Indian depredations directed toward white settlers and the
effects these had on territorial citizens.

Indian activity

threatened both statehood and the governor's career.

The

territorial governor became the sole official charged with
bringing the territory into the Union as a state, protecting
the interests of the Indian, and conducting United States
Indian policy.

These Herculean tasks could not be

successfully accomplished until the Indians became
"civilized," made acceptable to those white citizens within
his superintendency, or subdued by the military.

Thus,

"civilizing" the Indians became a critical and important
public and personal issue facing a territorial governor in
his role as ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs.
Ironically, governor's neglected the position, much to the
determent of Indian relations.
Because much that transpired in the formation of Indian
policy preceded the relatively late Montana Territory
experience (1864-1869), this paper will trace the origins
and implications of the United States Government's practice
of combining the positions of territorial governor with that
of the superintendent of Indian affairs.

Additionally,

7
selected experiences of individual territorial governors are
used to illustrate those means employed by them in the
execution of their duties.

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF COMBINING THE OFFICES OF TERRITORIAL
GOVERNORS AND SUPERINTENDENTS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: 1789-1873
The United States Congress had combined the
responsibilities of the superintendent of Indian affairs
with the territorial governor long before the creation of
the Montana Territory and the Montana Superintendency of
Indian Affairs.

The practice of combining these two very

diverse and often incompatible administrative posts began
early in the history of the Republic with the passage of the
Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787.

This Act, which

authorized the establishment of new states, also provided
the nation with its earliest system of territorial
government.

The law defined the criteria for the

establishment of a territorial government, and articulated
the young nation's commitment to westward expansion.

The

Northwest Ordinance legislation created the framework by
which a territory could become a state, with equal rights
and responsibilities of the other states within the Union.6
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 also mandated that the

6See

U.S. Statutes at Large, vol. 1, (July 4, 1776 -March
2, 1799) "An Act to provide for the Government of the
Territory Northwest of the river Ohio," pp. 50-53, or Henry
Steele Commanger, "The Northwest Ordinance", Documents of
American History, seventh edition, (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1963) pp. 128-132.
8

9
United States take those measures necessary to ensure the
humane treatment of the Indian peoples who actually owned
these western territories.

Article III of the Northwest

Ordinance provided that:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed
towards the Indians; their lands and property
shall never be taken from them without their
consent; and in their property rights and liberty,
they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless
in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress;
but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall
from time to time by made for preventing wrongs
being done to them, and for preserving peace and
friendship with them.7
The Northwest Ordinance created an irreconcilable
dilemma when policy makers proclaimed that American westward
expansion would be accomplished peacefully and assume that
tribesmen would willingly accept western expansion.
Congress further complicated peaceful expansion by charging
the territorial governors not only with the duties of
grooming each territory for eventual statehood, but also
mandating that the territorial governors hold the office of
ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

On September

11, 1789, Congress provided an annual salary of $2,000 to be
paid to the Governor of the Northwest Territories as
compensation for his duties "...and for discharging the

7U.S.

Statutes at Large, vol. 1, (July 4, 1776 - March 2,
1799) "An Act to provide for the Government of the Territory
Northwest of the river Ohio, August 7, 1779. p. 52.
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duties of superintendent of Indian affairs..."8

By

enacting this legislation, Congress established the
precedent of making territorial governors Indian officers,
responsible for conducting United States policy and Indian
affairs with the Indian tribes in their territory.
The policy of making one man responsible for two
different, potentially conflicting obligations (protecting
Indian interests while encouraging territorial expansion)
was doomed to failure.
advised decision?

Why did Congress make this ill-

James W. Nye, who served first as

Nevada's territorial governor and ex-officio superintendent
of Indian affairs from March 22, 1861 to July 18, 1865, and
then as two-term senator from Nevada, explained the rational
behind Congress' decision for combining the offices of
territorial governor and ex-officio superintendent of Indian
affairs.

On the floor of the Senate he explained:

The combination of duties is based upon the
economy of the thing. The Governor can discharge
the duties of superintendent, and thereby save
money. A Governor in a new Territory can live
just as cheap as a superintendent of Indian
affairs, if he chooses; and to have two officers
for this business makes too many heads.9

8U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, June 1, 1789 - March 3,
1799, "An Act for establishing the Salaries of the Executive
Officers of Government, with their Assistants and Clerks,"
September 11, 1789.
9The Congressional Globe, 4 0th Cong., 2d sess. No. 176.
p. 2801.
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In addition to cost effectiveness, Senator Nye believed that
a territory would be in greater danger from Indian
depredations if the office was split.

He reasoned that

there would be a delayed reaction in an Indian emergency as
the territorial governor and superintendent of Indian
affairs would have to confer as to the proper action to
take.
Senator Nye's attitude towards Indian affairs reflects
the attitudes of those lawmakers who passed the legislation
that created Montana Territory, and required the territorial
governor to wear two hats.

These men justified their

improper actions "...as the cheapest way of handling Indian
Affairs."10

The money saving practice of combining the

posts of territorial governors and ex-officio
Superintendents of Indian Affairs in the United States
Territories led only to disaster in Montana as it had in
other regions and times.

Like Senator Nye, these lawmakers

also perceived that position of superintendent of Indians
affairs as one mainly concerned with punishing errant
Indians, with little emphasis given to the protection of
Indians' rights.
From 1789 until 1824, the Secretary of War administered
Indian affairs with the exception of the government owned

10Pomeroy,

The Territories and the United States, p. 10.

12
and operated Indian trade factories.

Congress created these

factories under "An Act for establishing Trading Houses with
the Indian Tribes" on April 18, 1796.

This Act allowed

President George Washington to
...establish trading houses at such posts and
places on the western frontiers, or in the Indian
country, as he shall judge most convenient for the
purpose of carrying on a liberal trade with the
several Indian nations, within the limits of the
United States.11
From 1806 to 1822, a superintendent of Indian trade,
directly responsible to the Secretary of War, administered
these trade factories.

These factories, designed to operate

on a non-profit basis, allowed the Indians to secure trade
goods, such as blankets, knives, and axes, at fair market
value in exchange for their furs.

Although popular with the

Indians and those whites who believed that the government
houses fostered better relations between the races, the
factories came under increasing attack from traders and
politicians who believed the government had overstepped its
authority and embroiled itself in an area best left to free
enterprise and "Yankee" ingenuity.
Each Act authorizing the continuance of the factory
system's existence usually remained in force for a period of
three years before subsequent legislation of the same nature
nU.S.,

Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, July 4, 1776 - March
2, 1799, "An Act for establishing Trading Houses with the
Indian Tribes," April 18, 1796.
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had again to be passed to continue its operation.

The

American Fur Company's owner, John Jacob Astor, and the St.
Louis fur trading interests, whose positions were powerfully
expressed on the Senate floor by their unofficial spokesman,
Senator Thomas Hart Benton, lobbied against the factories.
Finally in May 1822, they convinced Congress to pass
legislation that permanently disestablished the factories.
Astor and Benton found their task simplified because
Congress had never been fully comfortable engaged in the
Indian trade.12
As the government trading factories closed, the Office
of Indian Trade evolved into the Office of Indian Affairs.
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, without authorization or
orders from Congress, created the Office of Indian Affairs
on March 11, 1824 .13

Calhoun appointed Thomas L. McKenney,

the last Superintendent of Indian Trade, as first
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.14

The Office of Indian

Affairs operated within the War Department from its founding
until July 9, 1832, at which time Congress authorized the
appointment of a Commissioner of Indian Affairs who was
responsible for directing and managing Indian Affairs and
12Prucha,

American Indian Policy in the Formative Years,

p. 92.
13Ibid.,

p.56.

14Ibid.,

p. 57.

14
reported to the Secretary of War.
In 1849, Congress detached the Office of Indian Affairs
from the Department of War and assigned it to the newly
created Department of the Interior.15

Although now under

the control of civilians, the Government's Indian policy did
not change appreciably.
on the frontier.

The military still provided defense

Because the regular military was often the

only law and policy enforcement agency on the frontier, the
separation of the Office of Indian Affairs from the War
Department resulted in conflicts over jurisdiction leading
to an inevitable lack of cooperation between the Department
of the Interior and the Department of War.

However, the

rift provided each Department with a convenient scapegoat to
blame when failures occurred in the implementation of
federal Indian policy.

The halls of government resounded

with the echoes of each department's champion lawmaker
competing to be heard over others in support of his
particular Department.16
Throughout these administrative changes,
superintendencies and agencies were mainstay offices and

15Edward

E. Hill, The Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1880:
Historical Sketches (New York: Clearwater Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1974), p. 1
16Alban W. Hoopes, Indian Affairs and Their Administration
with Special Reference to the West, 1849-60, Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932) pp. 16-17.

15
comprised the two field divisions within the Office of
Indian Affairs.

Positions in both the Indian Bureau's

administrative branch, headed by the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs and a cadre of clerks in Washington D.C., and its
field force of superintendents and agents, were filled by
political appointees and a few detached soldiers.
Oftentimes, the men in the field did not see a tribesmen
until they reached the seat of their respective
superintendency or agency.

Most appointments were based on

no better qualification than faithful party service.
Inexperienced with their charges, a majority of these
appointees were merely incompetent, while others, realizing
their positions were tenuous — dependent solely on election
outcomes — came to the office with deliberate intentions to
misuse their positions for personal gain in wealth, politics
or both.17
Superintendencies held general responsibility for
Indians in a large geographic area, an area which usually
included or mirrored an entire political division, such as
Montana Territory.

The governor of a territory often served

as ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs.

Congress

appointed full time superintendents in unorganized areas or
on those occasions when the duties of a superintendent were

17Utley,

The Indian Frontier of the American West, p. 42.

16
either particularly burdensome or volatile.18

All Indian

superintendents, whether their status was as ex-officio or
full-time, were not only required to oversee the Indians
under their jurisdiction, but also required to supervise and
to regulate those traders who conducted business with the
Indians.

In addition, they acted as watchdogs over the

agents assigned to the respective agencies within their
superintendencies.
Until the 1870's, Indian superintendents and agents
often enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and personal
discretion when performing their duties in remote, isolated
jurisdictions because conditions often made communications
difficult if not impossible with federal authorities in
Washington D.C..

On many occasions, superintendents

appointed agents and selected the sites for the agency's
headquarters.

As the double pressures of the government's

reservation policy and increased white immigration into
Indian territory gradually forced the tribesmen onto
reservations, the agencies lost their peripatetic nature and
Congress drafted legislation mandating that agency
headquarters be established in one location.

With this

centralization of authority, communications between
Washington D.C. and the agencies improved, and subsequently

laHill,

The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 2.
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the superintendents and agents lost much of their
autonomy.19

Centralization and improved communications

also led to direct communication between the commissioner of
Indian affairs and Indian agents.

With official

correspondence bypassing the superintendent of Indian
affairs, the status and authority of the office was so
weakened that the position, regardless of its status as exofficio or full time, became obsolete after the Civil War.
Individual Indian agencies and agents came under the
jurisdiction of its assigned superintendencies and
superintendents.

Until the 1870's, most Indian agents

reported to their superintendent; however, a few reported
directly to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in
Washington, D.C.

Because many Indian agencies were isolated

and far from communication centers, the Indian agent's
position occasionally became crucial.

They were often the

only government representation residing with the Indians.
The Indian agent, by virtue of his exclusivity, occasionally
undertook the delicate tasks of diplomacy and negotiation to
secure treaties with various tribes.

The agent's

responsibilities included the distribution of those
annuities and supplies required to honor previously
negotiated treaties authorized by Congress.

19Hill,

Agents were

The Office of Indian Affairs, pp. 2-3.

18
also required to undertake "civilizing" the Indians through
the use of government sponsored educational and agricultural
training methods and programs.

These programs became

increasingly important and desirable as the government
confined greater numbers of tribesmen on the
reservations.20
Although the President of the United States appointed
both Indian superintendents and agents with the advice and
consent of the Senate, he could not establish new Indian
superintendencies.

An Act of June 30, 1834, specifically

authorized the creation of certain superintendencies and
agencies.21

This woefully inadequate legislation provided

for only one full time Indian Superintendent, who was to
reside in St. Louis, Missouri, "...for all the Indian
country not within the bounds of any state or Territory west
of the Mississippi River.." and only two agents for the
Western Territory.22

Significantly, the act did not grant

the President the power to create either new
superintendencies or agencies, but rather allowed him to
decrease the number and/or change their locals as he deemed
20Hill,

The Office of Indian Affairs, pp. 1-2.

21The

Act of June 30, 1834 is printed in its entirety in
"The Commissioner of Indian Affairs Report" 1837 House
Executive Documents no 3, 25 Cong., 2d sess., Serial 321, pp.
648-58.
22Ibid.,

p. 665.

19
necessary.23
The Office of Indian Affairs circumvented the
restrictions the Act of June 30, 1834, by creating
subagencies, which did not require Congressional approval.
In effect, subagents acted as regular agents, but there were
some "technical" differences.

The subagencies were assigned

to agencies, not superintendencies, and the subagents
received half of the $1500 annual salary paid to a full
agent.24

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs could

establish additional agencies by creating "special
agencies."

Special Agents often carried out a specific

assignment, such as a treaty signing mission; but in other
cases they were simply regular agents, placed in charge of
their own Indian agency, and appointed in addition to
circumvent, the established quota of agents.25
The Congressional decision to combine both the
administrative duties of territorial governor and
superintendent of Indian affairs into one office resulted in
a monetary savings to the federal government, but at the
same time it created

anomalies and confusion within the

hierarchy of the government's bureaucracy.

23Ibid.,

p. 656.

24Ibid.,

p. 655.

25Hill,

It created the

The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 2

20
awkward situation of requiring the territorial governors to
report to two different federal administrators.

In their

capacity as territorial governors, they reported indirectly
to the President through the Secretary of State.

Strictly

a matter of protocol, this practice continued until 1867,
when Secretary of State William Seward ordered all
territorial business addressed directly to the State
Department, not the White House.26
As ex-officio Superintendent of Indian affairs,
however, territorial governors first reported to the
Secretary of War and later to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs.

Submitting written reports to an underling, the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs, must have rankled the
political sensitivities of a number of territorial
governors.

The commissioner of Indian affairs reported

directly to the Secretary of the Interior, who headed one of
the more junior government departments, and as territorial
governor, the same official reported directly to the
Secretary of State, who headed the oldest government
department.

This system created an uncomfortable anomaly

that required the territorial governor, to report to the
commissioner of Indian affairs, an inferior in the
government's hierarchy and protocol in the governor's

26Pomeroy,

The Territories and the United States, p. 10.

21
capacity as ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs.
Such an arrangement undoubtedly established the idea that
the duties of ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs
were of less importance and value than those matters
pertaining to the office of territorial governor.27
The root of the conflict between whites and the
tribesmen lay in the possession or use of land.

Effective

territorial governors promoted, or boosted, their
territories to encourage settlement, development, and,
ultimately, statehood.

Boosterism, however, did not

preserve peaceful relations with local tribal communities,
but encouraged conflict between the tasks of administrating
white men's affairs while maintaining the rights of Indians
often came into conflict with one another.

To many

westerners, the Indian personified the impediment to culture
and civilization.

Much as nature and the wilderness itself,

the tribesman became an obstacle that had to be overcome if
27The annual reports territorial governors submitted to
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs were the main liaison
between
the
territorial
governors
as
ex-officio
superintendents and Washington, D.C.
Over the years, the
Commissioners of Indian Affairs did not give territorial
governors discretionary guidelines for writing these annual
reports.
Each governor was expected to prepare reports
containing as much detail as possible, including a census, and
description of tribal lifestyle and culture. The completeness
of each annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
ultimately depended upon the individual governor's discretion,
talent, concern, and ability, or any combination of these
factors.
See Neil, "The Territorial Governor as Indian
Superintendent" pp. 213-214.

22
progress and civilization were to flourish.

The whites

coveted Indian lands, and the governor/ex-officio
superintendent of Indian affairs usually abandoned the
Indian's best interests for that of the white
constituent's.28

Self-interest dictated that the governor

concentrate on his territorial duties, since the potential
rewards, such as a seat in the U.S. Senate, were both
obvious and greater.

Unfortunately, these duties were

almost always accomplished to the detriment of his duties as
ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs.
Fiscal problems constantly influenced a territorial
governor's political decisions to either abandon or to
minimize their duties as ex-officio Superintendent of Indian
Affairs.

Financial concerns plagued territorial governors,

and the federal government slowly and often reluctantly
disbursed those funds slated for the territories. Further
complicating this matter was the fact that all forms of
currency, other than hard specie, was accepted at a discount
on the frontier.

Senator James W. Nye, former Territorial

Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs for
Nevada from March 22, 1861 through July 18, 1865, testified
on the floor of the Senate that the federal funds he
28For

a discussion of the conflicts between politics and
Indian affairs see Pomeroy, The Territories and the United
States and William M. Neil "The Territorial Governor as Indian
Superintendent".
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received to operate his territory and Indian superintendency
was accepted at the discounted rate of thirty-eight cents on
the dollar.29

Matters improved in this respect, but as

late as 18 66, U.S. Indian Agent Augustus S. Chapman at the
Flathead Reservation in the Montana Territory complained
that government checks drawn on a San Francisco bank were
devalued thirty percent; those drawn on Virginia City or
Helena twenty percent; and greenbacks, or government script,
were discounted ten percent.30
The territorial governor ran into financial
difficulties for two reasons.

First, the territorial

governor dispersed all territorial funds, but only the
territorial secretary possessed the authority to write money
drafts on the territorial account.

Second, the Federal

Government niggardly dispersed funds from its coffers, and
the territorial governor often attempted to perform the
Herculean tasks imposed by his office without the benefit of
clerks to assist him with his Indian superintendency duties.
If the territorial governors had a clerk assigned to assist
him in the administration of Indian affairs, the clerk's

29The

Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 2d sess. No. 176.

p. 2801.
301866

House Executive Document no. 1, 39th Cong., 2d
sess., serial 1284, "Annual Report of the Flathead Agency," p.
316.
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salary often came from the governor's private funds.31
During the 1870's, the Federal Government gradually
discontinued superintendencies.

The last combined

territorial governors/ex-officio superintendencies of
Wyoming, Dakota and Colorado were discontinued in 1871 under
the territorial governors. After that date, Indian agents
were appointed who reported directly to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs.32

Then, the Montana Superintendency was

abolished on June 30, 1873, and by 1878, the last
superintendency, a bureaucratic anachronism whose usefulness
had expired, finally ceased to exist.

From that time

forward, all Indian agents submitted their reports directly
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Office of Indian
Affairs, in Washington, D.C.

However, inspectors and

special agents were occasionally granted supervisory powers
over agents when conditions warranted - usually following
the aftermath of an Indian uprising.33
The Indian Superintendency constituted one bureaucratic
level of the Indian Service.

The government created the

Indian Bureau to conduct policy with the tribesmen, and
especially to deal with displaced people on reservations.

31Neil,

"The Territorial Governor", p. 216.

32Pomeroy,
33Hill,

The Territories and the United States, p. 18.

The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 3.
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The Indian Bureau also utilized its field agents as
negotiators (Congress used treaties to gain title to the
tribesmen's lands.)

There was little doubt that whites

would take the land held by the Indians.

Employing treaties

to secure this end perhaps soothed the country's conscience
by cloaking such seizure in a neat, legal blanket; however,
the government's use of war as an alternative to diplomacy
left the Indians without any alternatives other than
surrender or extinction.

The treaty system was flawed, as

Congress did not feel the same obligation to honor tribal
treaties as they did with those signed with foreign
powers.34
In spite of the difficulties in reconciling the
conflicting duties inherent in their roles as territorial
governor and ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs,
some early territorial governors conducted both
administrative offices effectively through an inherent
ability that allowed them to separate their two duties and
distinguish between their two roles.
Arthur St. Clair, William Henry Harrison, and William
Clark were among several early ex-officio superintendents of
Indian affairs who conducted their dual responsibilities in
a statesmanlike manner.
34Utley,

45.

Arthur St. Clair became the United

The Indian Frontier of the American West, pp. 42-
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States' first territorial governor when, on October 5, 1787,
he reluctantly acquiesced to those in Congress who urged him
to accept the appointment as Governor of the Northwest
Territory.

A Major General during the Revolutionary War,

St. Clair served as Pennsylvania's Delegate to the
Confederation Congress from November 1785 to November 1787.
In February 1787, St. Clair was elected President of the
Confederation Congress, and his tenure in that capacity
witnessed Congress pass in July the Ordinance of 1787 that
established the framework of government for the Northwest
Territory.35

St. Clair also became the nation's first ex-

officio superintendent of Indian affairs when on September
11, 1789, Congress passed legislation granting an annual
salary of $2,000 be paid to the Governor of the Northwest
Territory as compensation for his duties as superintendent
of Indian affairs.36
The Northwest Territory was a geographically defined as
the area that comprised all or parts of the current States
of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Minnesota.

The United States gained sovereignty over the

35Thomas

A. McMullin and David Walker, Biographical
Directory of American Territorial Governors, (Westport, Ct:
Meckler Publishing, 1984.) p. 261.
36U.S.

Statutes at Large, vol. 1, (July 4, 1776—March 2,
1799), "An Act for establishing the Salaries of the Executive
Officers of the Government with their Assistants and Clerks,"
p. 68.
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area by terms of the Treaty of Paris (1783) that ended
hostilities between the United States and Great Britain.
While it made great territorial gains, the new nation at the
same time inherited the Indian problems that had plagued
Great Britain in the region.

In 1763, reacting to the

successful Indian Confederacy put together by Chief Pontiac,
the British reaffirmed Indian rights and title to all the
territory west of the Appalachian Mountains.

In the early

1760's, King George Ill's government enacted laws to
prohibit settlers from immigrating into the area, to prevent
expensive Indian Wars.

The British government passed

legislation that negated all colonial land claims beyond the
Appalachian Mountains and established the Proclamation Line
of 1763, which forbade colonists from entering the area west
of the Appalachians until a more effective Indian policy
could be developed.

This became the first major grievance

the colonists harbored against British rule after the French
and Indian War.

This grievance and others eventually led to

the American Revolutionary War.37
Between 1784 and 1786, the United States dictated a
series of treaties with those Indians who had claims in what
is now eastern and southern Ohio.

37Robert

The American treaty

Kelley, The Shaping of the American Past, Vol.
1, 4th Edition, Teacher's Edition. (Englewood, NJ: PrenticeHall, Inc.) p. 90.
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"negotiators", accompanied by an intimidating military
escort, informed the Indians that Great Britain had ceded
the property that they now inhabited and announced that the
United States was now prepared to allow them to retain
possession of some of their lands.

The Indians were bullied

into signing these treaties and did not understand the terms
"sovereignty" and "right of soil."

Under these

circumstances, they refused to abide by the treaty terms and
commenced raiding white settlements, with British
encouragement.38
The Northwest Ordinance provided a framework of
government for the Northwest Territory.
area possessed very few settlers.

Previously, the

Passage of this Ordinance

opened the area to white immigration and settlement, which
increased hostilities between the tribesmen and the whites.
Confronted with escalating Indian depredations and an
impecunious treasury, the Articles of Confederation
Government decided to treat the different tribes as
sovereign nations and negotiate treaties with them rather
than launch a series of expensive military campaigns.

In

January, 1789, two treaties were signed at Fort Harmer,
Northwest Territory.

38Reginald

These reaffirmed the land cessions

Horsman, The Frontier in the Formative Years:
1783 - 1815, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1975.) pp. 35-36.
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from the previous treaties.

This time, however, the

government paid the signatory tribes $9,000.

Many tribes in

the area either did not sign or disavowed the Fort Harmer
Treaties, and hostilities resumed at a more heated pace than
before; the Territorial Capital at Marietta was reduced to
little more than a besieged camp.39

Although the Fort

Harmer Treaties can only be considered an unmitigated
failure, their implementation marked the beginning of the
Government's quixotic "treaty/annuity11 policy when it
negotiated with Indian tribes.

This policy approached

Indian relations with the confusing assumption that these
Indian "nations" inhabited the same land that the United
States claimed sovereignty over, a policy the federal
government followed until 1871.40
Heeding the appeals for help from the war ravaged
settlers in the Northwest Territory, the new, more powerful
Constitutional Government flexed its military muscles and
sent an armed punitive expedition in two columns against the
hostile Indians.

One column numbered some 1,500 regular and

militia troops was placed under the command of General
Josiah Harmar.
Cincinnati.

It struck north from Fort Washington, now

The western arm of the attack, 300 troopers

39Horsman,
40Kelley,

The Frontier in the Formative Years, pp. 39-40.

The Shaping of the American Past, p. 133.
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strong, was to march from Vincennes under the command of
Major John Francis Hamtramck.

All military operations were

planned in consultation with Territorial Governor and exofficio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Arthur St. Clair.
The campaign achieved nothing.

Harmar split his command and

lost 180 men in piecemeal actions.
the Indians he was after.

Hamtramck never found

The Indians, buoyed by their

success and supplied by the British in Detroit, increased
their depredations.41
In October, 1791, the Government again attempted to use
military force to bring order to the area, when in October
of that year, Arthur St. Clair lead a large force northward
from Fort Washington.

St. Clair spent one month moving his

command one hundred miles, only to have it routed by the
Indians with a loss of 600 men.

The survivors fled back to

Fort Washington in a matter of days.

Known as the "Battle

of No Name," this debacle was the worst defeat ever suffered
by an American army at the hands if the Indians.42

Only

after General "Mad" Anthony Wayne defeated the Indians at
the Battle of Fallen Timbers on August 20, 1794, and the
signing of the Treaty of Greenville in August 1795 did the

41Horsman,
42John

The Frontier in the Formative Years, p. 49.

Hoyt Williams, "Defeated Army In Shame" Military
History, Volume 5, Number 3 (December 1988) pp. 19-24.

31

area become safe for white settlement.43
Arthur St. Clair, a staunch Federalist, remained
Territorial Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Iiidian
Affairs for the Northwest Territory until President Thomas
Jefferson, a Republican, removed him from office on November
22, 1802, for partisan political reasons.

The Northwest

Territory was heavily Republican, and St. Clair tried to
keep the area from entering the Union and providing
additional votes for the Republicans.

After his removal,

the governorship fell to the territorial secretary, Charles
W. Boyd, who served as Acting Governor until Congress
created the State of Ohio on March 1, 1803.44
Arthur St. Clair's tenure as the Northwest Territory's
Territorial Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian
Affairs set many precedents that would guide the
government's policies throughout the first half of the
nineteenth century in its implementation of Indian policy.
Perhaps the most important policy established during the
years St. Clair was territorial governor/ex-officio
superintendent of Indian affairs was the precedent that
white expansion into the frontier would be at the expense of

43McMullin

and Walker, Biographical Directory of American
Territorial Governors, p. 262.
44McMullin

and Walker, Biographical Directory of American
Territorial Governors, p. 263.
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Indian land title.

The government preferred to use treaties

and annuities to secure title to Indian lands, but proved it
was not beyond the use of military force if a tribe proved
recalcitrant, refused to sign a treaty, or, worse yet, broke
an existing one.

During St. Clair's tenure, for the first

time these two disparate and conflicting offices were
combined under the aegis of a single official when Congress
joined the offices of territorial governor and
superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Designed with the hope of

avoiding similar costly Indian wars such as those St. Clair
undertook, Congress formulated the "treaty/annuity" plan in
order to secure title to Indian lands, and passed a series
of laws, in 1796, 1799, and 1802, "to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indian tribes.".45

During the

Northwest Territory experience, in the early years of the
Republic, there developed a recurrent pattern that defined
Indian-white relationships on the frontier.

First, a treaty

would be signed to turn Indian land title over to the
whites.

Then, the area would experience white immigration.

The terms of the treaty would be broken by either the
tribesmen or the whites, which led to Indian attacks on
white settlements.

After which, the settlers would call on

the government to provide military protection.

45Prucha,

An Indian
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war would ensue, and upon the war's conclusion, a new peace
treaty was signed, which often required the tribesmen to
cede more of their lands.46
William Henry Harrison, also typified the early breed
of territorial governors.

A scion of an aristocratic

Virginian family and later the ninth President of the United
States, he served as the first Territorial Governor and exofficio Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Territory
of Indiana from 1801 to 1812.47
Using his family's connections, Harrison secured a
commission in the army, and in 1792 was stationed at Fort
Washington, Northwest Territory, in what is now Ohio.

He

served as Aide-de-Camp to General Anthony Wayne and served
in Wayne's campaigns against the Shawnee, fighting in the
Battle of Fallen Timbers, and participated in the signing of
the Treaty of Greenville which opened much of the area to
white settlement.

After resigning his army commission in

June 1798, he accepted an appointment as Territorial
46See,

for example, Philip Weeks, ed., The American Indian
Experience; A Profile, Arlington Heights, Illinois: Forum,
1988), pp. 81-189, passim and Frederick E. Hoxie, ed., Indians
in American History, Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan
Davidson, 1988), particularly the essays "Indian/White
Relations: A View From The Other Side of The 'Frontier'" by
Alfonso
Ortiz;
"National
Expansion
from
the
Indian
Perspective" by David Edmonds; and "How the West was Lost" by
William T. Hagan.
47McMullin

and Walker, Biographical Directory of American
Territorial Governors, p. 149.
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Secretary of the Northwest Territory and worked in that
capacity under Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair.

He

used the Territorial Secretaryship as a platform to become
to Congressional delegate, after defeating Arthur St.
Clair's son by the narrowest of margins, one vote.

As

Territorial Delegate, he chaired a committee on public lands
and was instrumental in passing the Harrison Land Act in
1800.

This important legislation liberalized the terms

governing a citizen's purchase of frontier lands and
accelerated the influx of white farmers into the
frontier.48
Harrison recognized the problems inherent in the size
of the Northwest Territory, and his ideas led to the
creation of a separate Indiana Territory which included the
parts of western Michigan, eastern Minnesota, Indiana,
Illinois, and Wisconsin.

President John Adams appointed

Harrison as Territorial Governor and ex-officio
Superintendent of Indian Affairs to the new Territory of
Indiana on May 13, 1800.49
During Harrison's early years in office, he encountered
difficulties in discharging his duties in preparing Indiana
Territory for statehood while at the same time serving as
48McMullin

and Walker, Biographical Directory of American
Territorial Governors, pp. 149-150.
49Ibid.,

p. 149.
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the guardian of the Territory's Indians, forced him to
confront a myriad of important issues.

An able

administrator, he quickly tackled the problem of
lawlessness, streamlined the militia, and reorganized the
judiciary in Indiana Territory.

He also took measures to

defuse the volatile problem of slavery in the Territory.
However, all of these major and important issues paled in
importance compared to the Indian issues.

The Indians,

under the brilliant leadership of Shawnee Chief Tecumseh and
his brother Tenskwatawa, also known as the Prophet, built a
powerful tribal coalition that would not only sorely test
Harrison's diplomatic and military skills but, as allies of
the British in the War of 1812, posed a serious threat to
America's sovereignty over its frontier.50
Tecumseh and the Prophet made their historical
appearance in 1807.

The Prophet was an Indian shaman who

preached resistance to the white man's ways and desired a
return to the old Indian ways.

Tecumseh was a

political/military leader, determined to stop any further
white encroachment into Indian territory.

Tecumseh claimed

that no one tribe could sell Indian lands; all the tribes

50For

a discussion of the problems associated with white
immigration into Indian lands during this period, see David
Edmonds, The Shawnee Prophet, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1983). Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership,
(Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1984).
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had to be a party to any sale, or the transaction was
rendered invalid.

Armed and encouraged by the British

(relations between America and Great Britain steadily
worsened after the Chesapeake Affair in 1807), Tecumseh
built the most powerful and effective tribal confederation
to confront America's western expansion since the time of
Pontiac nearly fifty years before.

The problems the

Americans thought were resolved by the Battle of Fallen
Timbers and the Treaty of Greenville were resurrected, and
Indian relations in Indiana and Illinois steadily worsened
from 1806 through 1812.51
Despite increased Indian hostility and militancy, on
September 30, 1809, Harrison concluded a treaty and land
sale at Fort Wayne with the Miamis, Weas, and Delaware
Tribes.

Although Shawnee lands were not involved, Tecumseh

held to his stated views of not selling any more land to the
whites and viewed the Fort Wayne Treaty and subsequent land
sale with great alarm.

(Tecumseh, while visiting Harrison

at the Territorial capitol in Vincennes in 1810, threatened
Harrison with military reprisals, and declared the Treaty of
Fort Wayne invalid.)

A temporary truce prevented war, but

the following summer, the two antagonists met again at

51Francis

Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States
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(Lincoln:
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Harrison's estate in Vincennes.

When this meeting ended,

Tecumseh announced his intention to bring the southern
tribes into his confederacy.52
Harrison, with a force of regular and militia troops,
moved towards the Prophet's village in September 1811, with
the intention of with negotiating the tribesmen.

The

Indians rejected Harrison's efforts at diplomacy, and, on
November 7th, they attacked his column.

The Indians were

repulsed, but only at the cost of heavy American casualties.
The Battle of Tippicanoe, written in Harrison's official
report as an overwhelming victory for America, accomplished
very little in terms of bringing peace to the frontier.53
However, the battle established Harrison as an Indian
fighter and that served him well as a platform plank and
part of a campaign slogan that launched him into the White
House thirty-nine years later.54
The tribesmen proved their worth as British allies in
the War of 1812.

Initially, America suffered serious

defeats on its frontier, including the surrender of an
entire army in Detroit.
52Prucha,
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Perry secured the Great Lakes was Territorial Governor/Major
General William Henry Harrison able to defeat the British
and their Indian allies at the Battle of the Thames on
October 5, 1813.

This battle, although a marginal military

victory for the Americans, proved disastrous for the Indians
when Tecumseh was killed in the fighting.

The tribesmen

never recovered from this loss, and Tecumseh's mighty tribal
confederacy died with him.55
The Treaty of Ghent, signed on December 24, 1814, ended
the War of 1812.

The United States in its desire to impress

upon the Indians that the British had ceded all claims to
the old Northwest, sent commissions among the tribes to
ensure that the tribesmen understood that no further British
assistance would be forthcoming.

In order to ensure peace,

the War Department established a series of forts from
Chicago to St. Louis.

A peace treaty signed at Spring Wells

on September 8, 1815 reaffirmed peace between the tribes and
the United States and pardoned those Indians who continued
hostilities after 1811.56
Harrison's later career reflected on the quality of his
leadership.

He resigned his governorship in May 1813, after

a dispute with Secretary of War John Armstrong, and later

55Ibid.,

pp. 78-79.

56Ibid.,

p. 82.
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served as a State Senator in Ohio, a bank director, a United
States Senator, Minister to Columbia.

He capitalized on his

experiences as territorial governor and the fame won as an
Indian fighter.

In 1840, he successfully ran for President

of the United States employing one of the first successful
campaign slogans, "Tippicanoe and Tyler Too!"57

As

Superintendent of Indian affairs, Harrison performed better
than most.

One need not admire all of his policies to

appreciate the integrity and competence he brought to the
office.
The defeat of Mexico and the settlement of the Oregon
question with Great Britain enlarged the physical size of
the nation and dramatically increased the numbers of
tribesmen under its jurisdiction.

These increases rendered

the Act of June 30, 1834 obsolete.

Congress was compelled

to enact new legislation that would expand the number of
superintendencies and agencies to meet the new needs of the
nation.
In his Annual Report of 1849, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, Orlando Brown, pointed out the problems
created by the government's underfunding the Office of
Indian Affairs and the need for more efficient
administrative control over these newly acquired
57McMullin
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territories.

Brown believed these two problems blocked the

effective implementation of Indian policy.

When the

jurisdiction of Texas, Oregon, California, and New Mexico,
fell to the United States, the number of superintendencies,
still at the level of 1834, proved inadequate.

When

Congress passed the Act of 1834, it authorized the
establishment of five positions of Superintendents of Indian
Affairs.

Of these five, two were local agents for

particular tribes.

These two agents, called "acting

superintendents" were expected to perform, without any
increase of compensation, the duties of superintendents as
well as agents.58
Commissioner Brown made the specific point that the
others, the Territorial Governors of Oregon and Minnesota,
also held the posts of ex-officio Superintendents of Indian
Affairs, thus inferring that they were overwhelmed by their
responsibilities.

Commissioner Brown believed that the

territorial governors were inadequately compensated for
their extra duties as Indian Superintendents "...for which
they are allowed, the one fifteen hundred, the other one
thousand dollars per annum, in addition to their salaries as
governors."

581849
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superintendencies and noted the existence of only one full
and independent superintendent, located in St. Louis,
Missouri.

Accordingly he recommended the establishment of

seven "full and independent" Indian superintendencies.

His

suggested plan centered on the creation of four
superintendencies for the Indians east of the Mississippi
including Texas, and three for the Territories of Oregon,
California, and New Mexico.

This plan, he argued, "...

would supersede the necessity of governors acting as
superintendents."59
As Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Brown dealt with
political appointees rather than officers of the caliber of
St. Clair and Harrison.

Brown offered two major criticisms

concerning the operation of the Superintendent of Indian
affairs.

He disliked the system which allowed the governor

to locate his residence away from the Indians.

He also

expressed the opinion that a territory's superintendent of
Indian affairs should be a permanent appointment, because
the governor's position would terminate when the territory
achieved statehood.

This lack of continuity created a

situation in the Indian Bureau "...always producing changes
inconvenient, embarrassing, and injurious."60

59Ibid.,

p. 953.
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Due to the lobbying efforts of such men as Orlando
Brown, Congress provided for an expanded and different
arrangement between existing superintendencies and agencies.
The Act of February 27, 1851 increased the number of Indian
superintendencies east of the Rocky Mountains, and north of
New Mexico and Texas to three while decreasing the number of
agents and subagents in the same area from twenty-three to
seventeen.61

This reshuffling of superintendencies and

agencies, remained woefully inadequate to administer Indian
affairs on the American frontier properly.
The American Western Territories were the beneficiaries
of the Act of February 27, 1851.

Into the expanded number

of Indian superintendencies Congress appointed both famous
territorial governors, as well as a cadre of political hacks
who secured their appointments through the political
patronage system.

Brigham Young of Utah, Isaac Stevens of

Washington, were representative of the former, and Caleb
Lyon of Idaho was typical of the latter.

All served as

examples of later Territorial Governors and ex-officio
Superintendents of Indian Affairs.

The experience of this

later group preceded the Montana experience, but their story
provided insights into what would later take place in
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Montana.

Politics, finances, and Indian policy constantly

conflicted with the territorial governor's ability
adequately to perform their duties as ex-officio
superintendent of Indian affairs.62
Young's experience as both territorial governor and exofficio superintendent of Indian affairs demonstrated that
the combined administrative positions were at odds with one
another.

When President Millard Fillmore signed the Organic

Act of September 9, 1850 that created the Territory of Utah,
he appointed "Gentiles" to the offices of the territory's
secretary, judges, marshall and district attorney, but
reserved the governorship for the Head of the Church of
Latter Day Saints.

President Fillmore recognized that Young

had the total allegiance of his people.

This was crucial in

that many Mormons opposed organizing into a territory
because they believed they would be subjected to far less
bigotry and persecution in a unorganized province than in a
political unit under Congressional control.

Retaining Young

as the territorial governor would reduce their fears.63
Brigham Young was a capable leader.

As such, he also

understood the government's interest in carrying out Indian
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policy as efficiently as possible.

However, this

understanding did not prevent him from asking for more money
to carry out his plans of Indian pacification in Utah
Territory.

He laced his Annual Report to the Commissioner

of Indian Affairs, George W. Manypenny, in 1855, with
phrases such as "the small amount of expenditures", "The
cheap rate at which these results have been attained," and
"Advocating a course not only the least expensive to the
general government...", to describe the economical means he
used to implement Indian policy.64
Although Young paid lip service to the Federal
Government's desire to run Indian affairs as cheaply as
possible, he recognized that the funding allocated by the
Federal Government to run Indian affairs in his
superintendency was inadequate.

This realization prompted

Young to request more funds from the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs.

In his Annual Report to the Commissioner of Indian

Affairs, Young wrote:
You will at once perceive that not only myself,
but the subordinate officers of this
superintendency, find it impossible, as proven by
our united and best endeavors and judgements, to
carry out your admirable policy — which we all
happily coincide with — except at considerable
expense; hence may I not rely upon your powerful
mediation with the next Congress for
641855
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appropriations commensurate with the justice of
the case and the magnanimity of our nation?65
Young also complained about the burdens placed on him
in his dual capacity as both the Territorial Governor and
ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Utah.

He

believed his salary did not pay commensurate with the work
involved.

He wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs

suggesting that "...inasmuch as I perform the duties of both
offices, I am entitled to the pay appropriated for it, and
trust that you will so considerate it."66
As might be expected, his call for more pay landed on
deaf ears.

Indeed, Commissioner of Indian Affairs James W.

Denver had reached the end of his patience with Governor
Young and his constant requests for more funds.

In a letter

to Governor Young, Denver responded with the following
literary salvo aimed at Salt Lake City:
Sir: Your communication of the 12th of last
September has been received, and would not require
a formal reply were it not for the effort you make
to place this office in the wrong, when, in fact,
whatever difficulties exist have resulted from
your own conduct.
Your claim for double salary cannot be
allowed; for even if it did not come in conflict
with the general rule which forbids the payment of
two salaries at the same time to the same person,
yet you could not be entitled to it, for the
65Ibid.,
661857
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Senate Executive Document no. 11, 35th Congress,
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reason that you became superintendent of Indian
affairs by virtue of your appointment as governor
of the Territory; and although these offices have
since been separated, yet you had not, at the date
of your communication, been relieved of the duties
appertaining to them.67
In July 1857, Brigham Young's tenure as Territorial
Governor of Utah ended when President James Buchanan
replaced him with the appointment of Alfred Cumming during
the "Mormon War."68

On September 9, 1857, Jacob Forney was

appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Utah, and
Young's argument that the office should be split became a
reality, but too late for him to benefit.

After its

experience with Young, Congress separated the office of
superintendent of Indian affairs from the office of
territorial governor in Utah.69

67Ibid.,

Young.

Letter from James W. Denver to Governor Brigham
November 11, 1857.

68Rumors

had reached Washington D.C that the Mormans in
Utah were in open rebellion against the United States.
President James Buchanan sent 1,500 Federal troops with orders
to march on Salt Lake City to restore federal authority to the
"treasonous" Territory of Utah. Enroute, some brief skirmishes
occurred, but major battles in the so called "Morman War"
(Spring 1857 - Spring 1858) were avoided. The affair ended
abruptly when Buchanan reversed himself and pardoned the
Mormon leaders. With that, the Mormons allowed the troops to
pass through, but not encamp, in Salt Lake in June 1857. See
Furness, The Mormon Conflict: 1850 - 1859, or Stanley
Hirshon's biography of Brigham Young, The Lion of the Lord
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.) p. 102.
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As ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, the
territorial governor sometimes negotiated treaties with the
Indians within his jurisdiction.

Some territorial

governors, such as Washington Territory's Isaac I. Stevens,
entered these treaty meetings fully prepared and armed with
knowledge of the Indian's culture and desires and a full
vision of the treaty's importance to expansion.

A talented

thirty-five year old, blessed with phenomenal physical
stamina, Governor Stevens, a general, explorer, cartographer
and accomplished artist, demonstrated that one man, albeit
an extraordinary one, could accomplish the duties of
territorial governor and ex-officio superintendent of Indian
affairs.70
On March 2, 1853, in the waning days of his Presidency,
Millard Fillmore signed the Enabling Act that created
Washington Territory.

Although territorial governorships

were generally considered a second rate political position,
Stevens, to the disbelief of his friends and associates,
actively sought the position.

70For

An ambitious man, Stevens
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believed that as Washington Territory's Territorial Governor
and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, he could
become the spokesman for the Pacific Northwest, much in the
same way Harrison and Thomas Hart Benton became associated
with their respective regions of the Nation.

Having sown

the political seeds to secure his appointment by actively
campaigning for Franklin Pierce's successful presidential
bid, Stevens' nomination was approved on March 17, 1852.71
In addition, Stevens applied to Secretary of War
Jefferson Davis to lead the northern transcontinental
railroad route survey while enroute to Olympia, Washington
Territory.72

Railroad surveys, contrary to what the name

implies, were broad in scope.

Railroad survey reports, in

addition to topography, included as much information
possible concerning such topics as geography, meteorology,
botany and zoology.

As if these tasks were not enough to

occupy Stevens' energies, Commissioner of Indian Affairs
George W. Manypenny thought such an expedition would provide
Stevens with an opportunity "to acquaint the department as
fully as possible with the condition of Indian affairs in

71Richards,
72War
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Department Annual Report, 33d Cong., 1st sess., part
II, p. 20.
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that quarter."73
Arriving in Olympia in November 1853, Stevens proceeded
to set up a territorial government.

He then tackled the

problems of settling those claims the Hudson Bay Company
still had outstanding with the United States Government.
Because white immigrants had already flooded into the area
he recognized the urgent need to sign treaties to gain land
title and settle the area's Indians onto reservations.

A

careful observer, Stevens noted these Indians were
profoundly attached to their traditional lands.

Because

most of the area's tribesmen lived by fishing, relocation of
these tribes to the interior would be impossible.

On a

return trip to Washington D.C. in the spring of 1854, he
convinced Commissioner Manypenny of the wisdom behind his
plan to negotiate a number of treaties which would keep the
Indians on their traditional lands within small, non
contiguous reservations.

Accordingly, Congress appropriated

$45,000 to negotiate treaties with the Indians in Washington
Territory as well as an extra $80,000 to fund those expenses
likely to be incurred to negotiate and to sign a treaty with
the Blackfeet, Gros Ventres, and other tribes in the area

731853

House Executive Document no. 1, 33d Cong., 1st
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that would eventually become Montana Territory.74
Upon Stevens' return to Olympia in December 1854, he
began a whirlwind Indian treaty signing mission.

From the

winter of 1854 through the autumn of 1855, the energetic
Stevens managed to secure title to an area of settlement
from the Puget Sound to beyond the border of Washington
Territory and the jurisdiction of his Indian
Superintendency.75

He was especially interested in signing

treaties with the Blackfeet in the area that would
eventually become Montana Territory.

Stevens hoped to pave

the way for a railroad through their lands and to remove
them as a military threat to those tribesmen within the
Washington Superintendency.76
Accordingly, on October 17, 1855, Stevens signed the
Judith River Treaty with the Blackfeet tribes.

Under the

terms of the Treaty, the Blackfeet were not to establish any
permanent villages south of a line drawn ten miles north of
the Musselshell River, so that these lands, to the
Yellowstone, could be used in commonality by western tribes
to hunt buffalo.

74Prucha,
75Ibid.,

In return, the Blackfeet received
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76Richards,
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annuities.77
As a testimony to his abilities in carrying out these
difficult duties from the government's standpoint, Stevens
received a glowing review from the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, George W. Manypenny.

In his

annual report,

Manypenny wrote, "...I would refer... to the elaborate
report of Governor Stevens of Washington, as containing much
valuable and interesting information in regard to the
tribes, and the condition of Indian affairs in those two
Territories."78

Although he may have impressed the

Commissioner of Indian Affairs, a closer examination of his
record reveals some flaws with his handling of Indian
matters.
Stevens spoke condescendingly to and held a
paternalistic attitude towards the Indians; thus the treaty
negotiations he entered into were not two sided
negotiations.

Stevens' Treaties took the form of dictated

terms that the tribesmen were cowed or bribed into signing.
A number of Indian wars soon broke out.

In 1855, the Rogue

River War and the Yakima War broke out in Washington and
Oregon Territories.

77Ibid.,
781854

The causes of these wars were two-fold.

p. 232.

Senate Executive Document no. 1, 33d Cong., 1st
sess., serial 746, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs", p. 223.
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Congress dragged its feet ratifying Steven's treaties, and
the area experienced a large influx of white immigrants.
These wars dragged on until 1858 when the military power of
the Indians was finally broken at the Battles of Four Lakes
and Spokane Plains.

American military action achieved it

desired objectives in Washington and Oregon Territories.
After the subsequent hanging of those Indian parties
implicated in inciting attacks, Indians in the region never
resorted to war to settle their grievances again.79
The Judith River Treaty has often been credited with
maintaining peace with the Blackfeet until the Civil War,
when the pressures of white immigration into the area
heightened tensions and eroded the peace.80

By 18 64, and

the formation of Montana Territory, the area was a powder
keg awaiting a match.
Some ex-officio superintendents, such as Caleb Lyon,
Territorial Governor of Idaho from 1864-1866, initiated
Indian negotiations with little desire of learning anything
about the Indians under his charge.81

Such ethnocentric

attitudes almost always resulted in flawed or unworkable
Indian treaties.
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delicate and difficult.

Lengthy in ritual and formality,

patience was demanded of any successful Indian treaty
negotiator.

Although Lyon negotiated treaties with the

Boise and Bruneau Shoshoni, Congress never ratified them
because the whites in Idaho Territory rejected his
reservation proposals as too generous to the tribesmen.82
Territorial governors such as Lyons, because they received
their appointment as a political reward, came to their posts
ill-trained, ill-prepared, or lacking the temperament to
enter into such delicate diplomacy.

They also lacked the

training necessary to prepare for the inevitable Indian war
that followed.83
Lyon ended his career ignobly by embezzling $46,418 in
federal funds allocated for the Nez Perce Indians.

After

arriving east and being confronted with the accusation, he
claimed the money was stolen from his pillow during the
train trip, which contradicted his previous claim that the
money never arrived in Idaho.

He escaped conviction, and

retired to a life of writing poetry and collecting art at
his home "Lyonsmere" on Staten Island.84
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Unfortunately for Indian-American relations, many
territorial governors were drawn from the ranks of those in
the ilk of Lyons.

Ironically, however, even with honest,

ambitious men such as Stevens and Young, people possessed
with good intentions and abilities, their achievements
differed little from those of incompetent and dishonest
Lyons.

Even good territorial governors and ex-officio

superintendents of Indian affairs, were thwarted by factors
beyond their control: a lack of funding, inadequate means to
implement or enforce federal Indian policy, or their own
ignorance of their charges.

More often than not, many

territorial governors saw their positions as temporary - a
steppingstone that would lead to a seat in the United States
Senate when statehood was achieved.
thieves.

Others were simply

Against this backdrop, the Montana experience

began in 1864.

CHAPTER III
THE MONTANA EXPERIENCE: SIDNEY EDGERTON, 1864-66

During the Civil War, an event occurred that provided
an impetus for policy change that would eventually culminate
in a revision of the official relationships between the
tribesmen and the Federal Government.

On a cold and early

morning on November 29, 1864, Colonel John M. Chivington led
seven hundred militia troopers of the Third Colorado Cavalry
into the camp of Black Kettle, a Cheyenne Chief at Sand
Creek, Colorado.

Of five hundred Cheyennes, some two

hundred (fully two-thirds of whom were women and children)
died in what could only be termed a massacre.
In the west, whites lionized Chivington and the men of
the bloody Third as heroes.

It mattered little that Black

Kettle's band was friendly and that they had received solemn
promises of government protection.

What mattered to most of

the whites in Colorado and the west was fact that the
Indians were defeated, revenge was extracted, and, as a
result of the "battle", a clear message would be sent to all
tribes to change their ways or suffer the consequences.
Public opinion in the East, driven by the horror of the Sand
Creek Massacre, called into question the nation's practice
of allowing the military, especially local militias, to
55
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develop and administer Indian policy.

The realities of the

Civil War, however, mandated that the west would establish
its own Indian policy with little interference from the
federal government.

This remained so until the inauguration

of the country's greatest warrior, Ulysses S. Grant, in 1868
and the enactment of his vaunted Peace Policy.85
Again, the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864 in the Colorado
Territory compelled America's reformers to examine the
nation's treatment of, and improve its policy towards,
Indian peoples.

The Doolittle Commission, the body charged

with this task, consisted of the then Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, Nathaniel Green Taylor; the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, Samuel F. Tappen; former
general John Sanborn; and three military representatives,
appointed by President Andrew Johnson: Lieutenant General
William T. Sherman, Major General William S. Harney, and
Major General Alfred Terry.86

Simply put, this

investigative committee provided evidence that the role of
territorial government in the administration of Indian
Affairs, needed to be changed.

The existing system that

allowed territorial governors to administer or neglect
85Robert M. Utley, "The Celebrated Peace Policy of General
Grant," North Dakota History, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1953. P. 121.
86Robert
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Indian affairs as a function of their dual capacities, was
identified as an area that mandated reform.

Although the

events that led to a questioning of the nation's Indian
policy took place outside of Montana Territory, the impact
of the reform movement would exert a great impact upon the
governors and government of Montana Territory.
Idaho, in what was to become Montana, experienced gold
rushes of 1862-63 which upset the fragile balance of
relations previously established between the American nation
and the tribesmen based on treaties negotiated in 1851 and
1855.

Montana's gold beckoned to those miners who missed

the big placer strikes in Colorado and California.

Veterans

from the Union or Confederate armies recently discharged or
civilians displaced by the ravages of war came by the
thousands to start over and seek their fortunes.

The

Homestead Act of 1862 allowed many of these immigrants to
stake their claims to this new land.

Thousands of white

prospectors, merchants, and the usual camp followers
streamed into the Montana mountains.

This white "invasion"

spilled into or across valuable Indian hunting grounds, and
tensions increased until the region became plagued by
isolated violent clashes between the immigrants and the
tribesmen.

The Blackfeet especially felt this influx of

whites into Montana because the goldfields lay along and
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below the southern limits of their 1855 reservation.87
Miners in western Montana, concerned for their lives
and property and fearing Indian depredations, demanded
federal military protection.

The military not only provided

protection, but the frontier citizens also benefitted from
the financial boom that resulted from lucrative government
contracts required to support the fort and from military
payrolls, all of which bolstered local economies.
Regardless of their reasons, westerners' pleas for more
military protection found support among the lawmakers in
Washington D.C.

Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dennis N.

Cooley, who supported the use of the military as an Indian
policy enforcement agency, wrote:
It will thus be seen that the failure to establish
military posts upon the upper Missouri, together
with the severe and almost unexampled drought,
have resulted in an almost complete loss of the
controlling influence we have heretofore held upon
the Indians of that country, and that as a
consequence the important and most direct route of
the immigration setting in upon Idaho, by reason
of the newly discovered and immense gold-bearing
districts of that Territory, is cut off.88
This "most direct route" the Commissioner referred to
was the famous Bozeman Trail.
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Bozeman and John Jacobs, the Bozemen Trail ran from Deer
Creek, near present day Casper, Wyoming, to Virginia City,
Montana,.

An offshoot of the Oregon Trail, the Bozeman

Trails held several attractions for those journeying to the
goiafieids of Montana.

The Bozemen Trail not only provided

the travelers with a route that bypassed the rugged Rocky
Mountains, but the lush and fertile grassland along the
trail also provided the necessary forage required by the
goldseeker's livestock and draught animals.

However,

travel along the Bozeman Trail also proved dangerous, as it
crossed the prime hunting grounds of the Sioux, Northern
Cheyenne, and Blackfeet tribes.

These mobile hunters

required large tracts of land to continue their way of life.
The immediate past had demonstrated to these Indians that
wherever white men traveled or settled, firewood and forage
grew scarce and the buffalo disappeared.

As a result, these

tribes strongly resisted white encroachment, and quite often
this resistance manifested itself in violence.

Indeed, the

Bozeman Trail experienced a violent baptism when the first
wagon train to attempt to travel on the Bozeman Trail, led
by John Bozeman, was turned back by the Sioux short of its
intended destination of Virginia City.

As a result of this,

and other fierce clashes, the trail soon became known as
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"The Bloody Bozeman."89
With the end of the Civil War in April 1865, the nation
once again looked west to the frontier.

After many years of

neglect, government funds once again became available, and
western matters gained a renewed priority in Washington.

As

part of its plan to protect white immigrants using the
Bozeman Trail, the government established two forts in 1866.
One was the short lived Camp Cooke at the mouth of the
Judith River, 100 miles down the Missouri from Fort Benton,
the other Fort C.F. Smith on the Big Horn River.

The

following year, the government constructed Fort Ellis and
Fort Shaw, the two major military bases on the mining
frontier.90

Fort Shaw's position on the Sun River crossing

near the Mullan Road, enabled the military to intercept any
hostile Blackfeet Indians who intended to raid the southern
mining camps.

Fort Ellis, built on the western side of the

Bozeman Pass near the town of Bozeman, shielded the
southeastern flank of the goldfields from those Sioux
operating out of the Yellowstone Valley.91
In an attempt to end the violence between the whites
89For
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and the tribesmen, policy makers in Washington D.C. urged
that the government undertake a plan that would "civilize"
the Indians.

The American nation's notion of "civilizing

the Indians" had one broad interpretation - the tribesmen
would be civilized according to western concepts.
as 1854,

As early

Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny

foresaw the detrimental impact that white immigration would
have on Indian/white relations.

With this in mind,

Manypenny instructed treaty negotiator Isaac Stevens, to
insist that any treaty negotiated with the Blackfeet reflect
the government's plan to "Civilize the Indian."

The Judith

River Treaty (1855), which brought the Blackfeet into the
reservation system, indeed attempted to "gradually reclaim
the Indians from a nomadic life," and to "encourage them to
settle in permanent homes and obtain their sustenance by
agriculture and other pursuits of civilized life."92
The federal government never promulgated a set formula
to implement its policy to "civilize" the Indians.

Quite

often the entire process fell under the jurisdiction and
discretion of the individual Indian agents or a
"superintendent. "William P. Dole, the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs during Abraham Lincoln's administration,

believed

that confining tribesmen to reservations provided them with

92Ewers,

The Blackfeet, p. 214.
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their best hope to learn the ways of white civilization.
Dole wrote:
...the policy, recently adopted, of confining the
Indians to reservations, and from time to time as
they are gradually and become accustomed to the
idea of individual property, allotting to them
lands held in severalty, is the best method yet
devised for their reclamation and advancement in
civilization.1,93
Intimidating and difficult as these objectives appeared to
implement, they provided both the official policy and the
guidelines employed by the United States Government in its
dealings with Native American tribesmen.

These vague and

open-ended statements provided the official guidelines to
the territorial governors serving as ex-officio
superintendents of Indian affairs.

Montana Territory's

first Territorial Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of
Indian Affairs, Sidney Edgerton, confronted the difficult
task of implementing this policy in Montana Territory.
On May 26, 1864, Lincoln signed the Enabling Act
creating Montana Territory.

By signing this Enabling Act,

Lincoln also created the Montana Superintendency to
administer the Territory's tribesmen.

At this time, both

the Territory and the Superintendency were common federal
administrative units, designed to exist only until their

931862
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varied objectives had been reached.

Sidney Edgerton,

Montana Territory's first governor, assumed the position of
ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs for the Montana
Superintendency of Indians when he accepted the appointment
of Territorial Governor.

The record of his administration,

which extended from June 22, 1864, to July 13, 1866,94
amply illustrated the disastrous results of combining these
two administrative units, with differing objectives, under
one office.
Edgerton's career as a territorial politician began on
March 6, 1863, when Territorial Governor William Wallace of
Idaho nominated him to the position of Chief Justice of
Missoula County, Idaho Territory.

Shortly after he reached

his assigned location, the gold mining town of Bannock,
Idaho Territory, the town's citizens, as well as those of
nearby Virginia City, collected $2,500 in gold samples and
enough cash to send Chief Justice Sidney Edgerton to
Washington, D.C.

Edgerton's mission was as a

representative to plead with Congress for the creation of a
new territory.

The citizens of Bannock and Virginia City

argued that the territorial capital in Lewiston was
inaccessible and could not represent their interests.
Travel and communication between the goldfield communities,

94Hill,
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then part of Idaho Territory, and the Territorial capital at
Lewiston proved impossible much of the year.

Heavy snows in

the winter blocked the Mullan Road, the only road leading
from the goldfields to those connections to Lewiston, and
made the route impassible until well after the spring thaw.
Citing this inaccessibility and the immediate need for
government to adjudicate mine claims, these proto-Montanans
believed that the creation of another territory would make
their government more accessible and responsive to their
needs.95
Justice Edgerton possessed impeccable political
credentials and proved to be an excellent choice to send to
Washington D.C.

A Radical Republican from Ohio, he had

represented the Buckeye State for two terms in the United
States House of Representatives.

More important, he had

befriended both President Abraham Lincoln and fellow Ohioan
James M. Ashley, the chairmen of the powerful House
Committee on Territories.96

Immediately upon arriving in

Washington, he met and reestablished old ties with former
Idaho Territorial Governor William Wallace who now served as
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the territorial delegate to Congress from Idaho
Territory.97
Wasting little time, Edgerton secured a meeting with
President Lincoln, who fully endorsed the creation of
another territory in the Northern Rockies.

An astute

politician, Lincoln recognized the creation of another
western territory as an opportunity to appoint additional
Republicans to high territorial offices and eventually a new
Republican State.

Edgerton also discovered that

Representative Ashley had initiated some of the required
political groundwork by introducing a bill designed to
provide a temporary government for the Territory of Montana
on December 14, 1863.98

Ashley and other like-minded

Republicans listened favorably to western citizen's demands
for the creation of more territories and accompanying
territorial governments.

They argued that although the cost

of a territorial government was approximately $20,000 a
year, the protection supplied by tighter governmental
control over smaller areas would help prevent large scale
Indian uprisings and result in an actual savings to the
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Federal Government."

Through the creation of new

territories, the Republicans, as long as they retained
control of the executive branch of government, would enjoy
the partisan political benefit of appointing Republicans to
high positions of territorial government.

This was

especially important as the Republican Party represented a
minority of voters.
While Edgerton lobbied in Washington, D.C., the Idaho
Territorial Legislature proposed their own plan to create a
new territory.

Realizing that the current Territory of

Idaho was too large to manage efficiently and that new
territories would by necessity have sizeable portions carved
from it to create new territories, in early 1864, the Idaho
Territorial Legislature petitioned Congress to create
"Jefferson Territory" from land already under Idaho's
jurisdiction.

Jefferson Territory, if created, would have

the Continental Divide and the 113th Meridian as its western
border, and would place Idaho's eastern border just west of
the Deer Lodge Valley.

This arrangement would conveniently

eliminate Idaho Territory's problems with the Blackfeet and
Sioux.100
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Edgerton, however, envisioned Montana's western border
on the crest of the Bitterroot Mountain Range.

The

Bitterroot boundary would secure the gold fields in Deer
Lodge County, the Flathead Valley, the Upper Clark Fork
Valley, and middle Kootenai Valley, all rich in agricultural
and mining resources, for the new territory.

He convinced

Idaho's Territorial Delegate, William Wallace, that as
matters now stood, the Idaho Legislature's "Jefferson
Territory" plan ill-served the settlers east of the
Bitterroots, as it ignored the problem of accessibility to
Lewiston.

Edgerton's plan, however, insured that the gold

camps of Alder Gulch, Grasshopper Creek, and Gold Creek
would have year-round-access to the population centers in
Bannock and Virginia City.101
Convinced of the wisdom in Edgerton's plan, William
Wallace supported his friend, going as far as to endorsing
the Bitterroot boundary before the hearings conducted by the
House Committee on Territories.

The combined testimony of

both Edgerton and Wallace swayed the Committee.

The House

Committee approved the Bitterroot boundary, and Congress
quickly passed it into law.102
Lincoln signed the Enabling Act into law on May 26,
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1864, and created Montana Territory.

Idaho Territory

suffered the loss of a 130 mile strip of territory along
half of its northern and eastern boundaries.

The

combination of William Wallace's testimony, Sidney
Edgerton's alliance with James Ashley, and most important,
Sidney Edgerton's tireless and incessant lobbying, secured
for Montana Territory some of the region's most economically
important and grandest terrain.

Lincoln rewarded Edgerton

for his work by appointing him to be Montana Territory's
first Territorial Governor and ex-officio Superintendent of
Indian Affairs.103
The creation of Montana Territory also provided
convenient boundaries for the creation of a new Indian
superintendency.

The Indian Service quickly acted to

establish the Montana Superintendency of Indian Affairs and
charged it with administering the nation's relations with
the tribesmen in Montana Territory.

Upon Edgerton's

appointment as Territorial Governor and ex-officio
Superintendent of Indian Affairs on June 22, 1864, the
Montana Superintendency held responsibility for two
agencies: the Blackfeet and the Flathead.104
103For
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The Office of Indian Affairs, pp. 99-100.
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Unlike a specific Indian agency, where the agent was
responsible to tribesmen located at a specified location, an
Indian superintendency encompassed several agencies within a
political or geographical tract.

The ex-officio

superintendent of Indian affairs responsibilities lay in
maintaining relations with and fulfilling United States
treaty obligations to all tribesmen within the
superintendency's jurisdiction.

In essence, the Indian

superintendent became another federal official placed
between the field agent and the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs.

The agents in charge of agencies reported directly

to the ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, who then
reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.105
The Montana Territorial Governor served as ex-officio
Superintendent until 1869, when Congress appointed an
independent federal authority to operate the office.

During

this initial period, Indian agents in the Montana
Superintendency reported to the Territorial Governor or
independent superintendent until the superintendency was
105Here

the
"chain
of
command"
became
muddied.
Territorial governors were directly responsible to the
Secretaries of the Interior. As ex-officio superintendents of
Indian affairs, they were responsible to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, who reported to the Secretary of the Interior.
There can be little doubt that with this arrangement, many
territorial governors thought of their role as ex-officio
superintendents a lesser role than governor. See Neil, "The
Territorial Governor as Indian Superintendent in the TransMississippi West," p. 214.

70
discontinued on June 30, 1873.

After the office of

superintendent was abolished, the middle level management
was eliminated, and agents reported directly to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington, D.C.106
When Congress created the Territory of Montana and the
Montana Indian Superintendency in 1864, the Indian agencies
under its jurisdiction consisted of the Blackfeet and the
Flathead Indian Agencies.

Of the two agencies in the

Montana Indian Superintendency in 1864, the Flathead Agency,
established in 1854, was the older.

The Flathead Agency had

been initially placed under the Washington Indian
Superintendency's jurisdiction.

Its headquarters was first

located near the junction of the Flathead and the Jocko
Rivers.

The agency's tribal population was divided between

the Kootenai and the Pend d'Oreille Tribes, who lived on the
Jocko Reservation; and the Flathead-Salish, who resided in
the Bitterroot Valley.

In 1857, while the Washington and

Oregon Superintendencies were temporarily combined under the
provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1857, Congress
consolidated the Flathead Agency and renamed it the
"Washington East of the Cascades Agency."107
106Hill,
107U.S.,

The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 99.

Statutes at Large, Vol. 11, (December 3, 1855 —
March 3, 1859) "An act making appropriation for the Current
and Contingent Expenses of the Indian Department for
fulfilling Treaty Stipulations with various Indian tribes, for
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In 1861, the Flathead Agency was reestablished and
transferred from the Washington to the Idaho Superintendency
in 1863.

With the creation of Montana Territory, Congress

transferred the agency to the Montana Superintendency in
1864.

From September 1865 until February 1866, Congress re

assigned the Agency to the Idaho Superintendency "...for
greater facility of communication."108

Sidney Edgerton

realized the communication problems this would create, and
while in Washington D. C. he wrote:
While I am not particularly desirous to have
charge of the Flathead Agency, at the same time I
trust you will allow me to submit that the
distance from Flathead Agency to Boise City, the
Capitol of Idaho, where the Governor resides, is
about 400 miles farther then to my residence.
Furthermore, during the winter months, all
communications from the Agency have to be sent via
Virginia City to Boise City, inasmuch as the
Bitterroot Mountains are situated between and on
the direct route from Flat Head Agency to Boise
City.109
Congress reversed itself in 1866, by returning the Flathead
Agency to the Montana Indian Superintendency's

the year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and fiftyeight," 3 March 1857.
1081865

House Executive Document no. 1, 39th Cong., 1st
sess., serial 1248, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs" p.200.
109Governor

Sidney S. Edgerton to Commissioner of Indian
Affairs D.N. Cooley, January 24, 1866, Letters Received,
Office of Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, Roll 488,
Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA.
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jurisdiction.110
The second agency in the Montana Superintendency
consisted of the Blackfeet Agency. The signing of the Judith
River Treaty in 1855 established the reservation and
situated the headquarters of the Blackfeet Agency at Fort
Benton.

Although federal law outlawed the practice of

trading whiskey to the Indians, this practice remained
common at the fort.

Due to Fort Benton's isolated location,

the law was not enforced.

Compounding the lack of a law

enforcement agency was the fact that very few Fort
Bentonites sought to have the law enforced.

Most were

illegal whiskey traders, and huge profits were gained
through this illegal activity.
From 1855, until the creation of the Montana
Superintendency, the Blackfeet Agency, comprised of the
Blackfeet, Piegan, Blood, and Gros Ventre Tribes, came under
the jurisdictions of the Central, Dakota, and Idaho
Superintendencies.

The Blackfeet Agency's headquarters

remained at Fort Benton until 1869, when the facility was
moved to a site on the Teton River approximately 75 miles
northwest from Fort Benton.111

110Hill,

The Blackfeet Agency, while

The Office of Indian Affairs, p. 100.

1111869 House Executive Document no. 1, 41st Cong., 2nd
sess., serial 1414. "Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, Blackfoot Agency Report" p. 742.
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located at Fort Benton, created the most trouble for
Montana's Territorial Governors as ex-officio
Superintendents of Indian Affairs.112
Fort Benton was a wide open town with a history of
lawlessness.

Established in 1846, it holds a strong claim

to be the oldest continually inhabited town in Montana.113
Fort Benton, often referred to as the "World's Innermost
Port", lay at the western most point of the Missouri River
navigable by commercial river traffic.114

In 1864, Fort

Benton, located in the heart of Blackfeet country, was
surrounded by a number of past and present Blackfeet trading
posts.

These posts included Fort Piegan, 1831-32; Fort

McKenzie, 1832-44; Fort Cotton, 1844-45; Fort Lewis, 184547; Fort Campbell, 1846-47; Fort Campbell II, 1847-59; Fort
Labarge 1862-66; and Fort Francis A. Chardon, 1844-46.115
Fort Benton's economic importance grew with the beginning of
the buffalo robe trade.

Buffalo robes, far too heavy to be

112For

a detailed discussion of the problems at Fort
Benton, which include racial tensions and whiskey trading, see
Ewers, The Blackfeet, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1958) Chapter 14.
113Joel Overholser, Fort Benton: World's Innermost Port
(Fort Benton, MT: Joel Overholser, 1987), p. 19.
114From St. Louis, Missouri, it is 2,385 miles on the
Missouri River to Fort Benton, and a further 1,100 miles to
salt water. See Overholser, Fort Benton, p. v.
ll3Ibid.,

p . 30.
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economically freighted overland from the frontier, could be
profitably shipped by steamboat down the Missouri River from
Fort Benton to the commercial trade center at St. Louis,
Missouri.116
The Federal Government did not possess the economic and
military resources to exercise its authority in Eastern
Montana Territory, and the tribes inhabiting this area, the
Western Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Crow, lived outside of
the reservation system.

Eastern Montana was sparsely

populated and the territorial tribesmen who inhabited this
region continued their traditional hunter/gatherer lifestyle
with little interference from the American Government.117
When Sidney Edgerton was appointed Territorial Governor
of Montana and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs
for Montana Territory, he held the task of moving the
Territory towards statehood while directing the tribal
populations towards civilization.

Edgerton and his

successors learned that being in charge of these delicate
and opposing tasks could become an administrative nightmare
especially when opposing obligations could not be carried

116Ibid.,
117By

p. 35.

1867, through a series of military battles
sieges, Chief Red Cloud and his Sioux warriors forced
United States to abandon its series of Forts built along
Bozeman Trail.
For an history of the Bozeman Trail,
Johnson, The Bloody Bozeman.

and
the
the
see
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out.

The agents, already in place at the Flathead and

Blackfeet Agencies, now reported to Edgerton as ex-officio
Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Despite the assistance of

two experienced Indian agents, he inherited the problems
with the Blackfeet, and maintaining relations with the
Blackfeet became the new Territorial Governor's major tribal
concern.118
Fort Benton's proximity to the new Territory's western
settlements fostered tensions which often erupted into
violence between the Blackfeet and the whites.
immediate problems were two-fold.

Edgerton's

The first focused upon

the very location of the Blackfeet Agency at Fort Benton,
which was far from any civil authority.
hundreds of miles from Fort Benton.

Law and order ended

The second problem

concerned the enforcement of past treaty obligations the
United States had made with the tribesmen especially the
timely distribution of the Indian's annuities.119
Edgerton faced long term problems with the Blackfeet
that he could not solve.

The issue of white encroachment on

Blackfeet Tribal lands required the territorial governor/ex-

118For

a discussion of the Blackfeet in Montana Territory
during the Civil War, see Edmund Jefferson Danzinger, Jr.,
Indians and Bureaucrats: Administrating the Reservation Policy
During the Civil War, Chapter 11 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1974).
119Ibid.,

p. 68.
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officio superintendent's attention, however, given his lack
of an efficient police force, there remained little Edgerton
could do to evict these white trespassers.

Even if he had

such a force at his command, political disaster would befall
any governor who turned soldiers against citizens.

On the

other hand, Edgerton's position as Territorial Governor
mandated he encourage and protect immigration and that he
act to hasten the transformation of Montana Territory to
Montana State.

The use of force might expedite that

transformation, but excessive force might inflame popular
opinion in the East, thus jeopardizing his position as
territorial governor.
Compounding the problem, the United States Congress
appropriated territorial funds slowly.

This lethargic

fiscal action forced agents to deliver the treaty annuities
promised to the Indians sporadically, at best; and the
Indians, resentful of this inexcusable delay, grew angry.
Contact with whites brought diseases.

Not understanding

communicable diseases, and witnessing the decimation of
their families and tribal members, the leaders of the
Blackfeet Confederacy accused whites of spreading poison
through these annuities.120

Finally, ruthless,

irresponsible traders, who provided whiskey to tribesmen and

120Ibid.,

p.51.
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therefore won the friendship of the Indians.

The stature of

those traders with the tribesmen grew as white encroachment
on Indian lands increased, which threatened the traders and
tribesmen.

This process furthered the region's instability.

White immigration into the Bitterroot Valley forced even the
peaceful Salish Indians who lived there to display an ever
increasingly hostile attitude towards the whites.121
Montana territorial citizens compounded the tribal
problems by criticizing Congress's relations with tribes.
Congress' actions disgusted frontier settlers who believed
the Eastern Congressmen were too far removed from the scene
to understand either Indians or the proper way to deal with
them.

Westerners expressed opinions implying that

Easterners mollycoddled the tribesmen.

They believed that

the best method of handling Indian affairs was with lead
fired from a rifle.122
Hostilities between tribes and whites often helped to
boost the western economy.

Equipping an American military

force was quite expensive.

Most of the gear would be

purchased from local dealers at inflated prices, and the
bill for these expenditures would be sent back to Washington
121Robert

G. Athearn, "Early Territorial Montana: A
Problem in Colonial Administration," Montana Magazine of
History, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 15.
122Robert

G. Athearn, "Frontier Critics of the Western
Army," Montana Magazine of History, Vol. 1, No. 3, p.15.
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D.C. for reimbursement.

Westerners also wanted the

government to provide permanent military bases in their
territories, and, most significantly, they demanded a
reduction of Indian lands and the opening up of these
"freed" lands to settlement.

Herein lay the main

contradiction faced by Edgerton and the other western
territorial governors:

it was impossible to please his

white constituents to move the Territory towards settlement
and statehood while at the same time effectively discharging
his duties as the federal representative and guarantor of
Indian rights and property.
As Montana's first Territorial Governor, Sidney
Edgerton undertook those first steps, as described under the
organic act, to start the wheels of territorial government
into motion.

Arriving in Bannock from Washington, D.C. in

July, 1864, he busied himself with the formation of judicial
districts, commissioned county officers, named Bannock as
the temporary Territorial Capital and ordered a census
taken.123
Edgerton had functioned brilliantly as the elegant
spokesman who pleaded for creating Montana Territory.

He

possessed the ability to immerse himself into and follow
through to successful completion one straightforward task at
123Spence,

p. 20.
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one time.

On the other hand, Edgerton compromised only

reluctantly, and this hurt him in the unforgiving world of
Montana Territorial politics, an arena where give and take
was essential.

A Radical Republican and abolitionist, the

Ohioan had little in common with the Democratic majority of
in Montana Territory, many of whom expressed Southern
sympathies.
Reluctant to operate outside the boundaries of partisan
politics, Edgerton could not hide his contempt toward the
Democrats.

In his opening speech to the first Territorial

Legislature, Edgerton called former Democratic President
James Buchanan an "imbecile" in referring to his mishandling
of the events that led the nation towards the Civil War.124
Afraid of Southern sympathizers in Montana's Territorial
Government, he insisted that all the legislators take the
"Iron Clad Oath".

This oath bound its taker to swear that

he had never taken up arms against the United States, and
was intended by Congress to insure the loyalty of all newly
installed officials in the reconstructed South.

The

Democrats and Edgerton agreed on the necessity for laws
concerning road construction and maintenance, founding

124Sidney

S. Edgerton, "Governor Edgerton's First
Message", Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana.
Vol. Ill, 1900. p.347.
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public schools, and those involving irrigation and
mining.125
The Governor's uncompromising, idealistic nature also
adversely affected tribal relations.

Indeed, his stated

Indian policy was confusing and worked toward cross means.
It also typified politicians of that era, particularly those
who held the position of territorial governor/ex-officio
superintendent of Indian affairs.

In his first message to

the Territorial Assembly, Edgerton promised to punish
promptly and severely any Indian aggression, however he also
warned that whites would be punished if they infringed on
Indian rights.

He summed up his statements on Indian policy

with:
I trust that the Government will, at an early day,
take steps for the extinguishment of the Indian
title in this territory, in order that our lands
may be brought into market.126
How could one man work to extinguish the Indian's title to
their lands, and at the same time act as a guardian of their
interests and maintain peace?

The difficult, if not

impossible, task was made still more challenging by the
partisan politics of the era.

Edgerton's final remark

125Malone and Roeder, Montana: a History of Two Centuries,
pp. 76-77.
126Edgerton, "Governor Edgerton's First Message", as cited
in Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana, Vol.
Ill, 1900. p.344.
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concerning his Indian policy illustrates the contradictions
and unworkable goals inherent in the combined office of
territorial governor/ex-officio superintendent of Indian
Affairs.
Despite the severity of the Indian troubles facing
Montana Territory and his administration,

Edgerton simply

neglected his role as ex-officio Superintendent of Indian
Affairs.

He complained to Secretary of State Seward that:

...the duties devolved upon me by virtue of my
office, as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, were
not defined by any instructions from the
Department, and the subordinate agencies were
securing supplies from other channels than through
me. The Indians within my Superintendency, with
an unimportant exception, held the title to the
mineral and agricultural portions of the
Territory, which were settled; some of them were
intensely hostile, and not a soldier was in the
Territory, nor had any force been ordered there,
so far as I could learn, to protect the rapidly
increasing and important interest there
existing.127
Upset with the lack of funds and staff personnel
received from Washington, Edgerton was overburdened with the
multitude of duties required to organize Montana's
Territorial Government.

In a letter of April 4, 1866,

Edgerton claimed he was overworked and complained to
Secretary of the Interior James Harlan of not having a

127Secretary of
of Indian Affairs
Received, Office of
Roll 488, Microcopy

the Interior Jason Harlan to Commissioner
D.N. Cooley, April 4, 1866,
Letters
Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency,
234, RG 75, NA.
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Territorial Secretary, of the necessity of employing a clerk
for his superintendency of Indian affairs, and of being
compelled to pay this clerk from his own funds.

He was

saddled with the burdens of his job and the added duties of
the Secretary that devolved upon him.
Edgerton justified employing a clerk by citing examples
of his many tasks including presiding over the legislative
session being held as well as the "...difficulties with the
Blackfeet ..., which rendered the services of a clerk
absolutely necessary."128

One cannot blame him for being

upset with his thankless job, as only a territorial
secretary could release funds and Edgerton operated as a
territorial governor for one year without one.129
Additionally, Edgerton bore the added expense of paying for
many of Montana's expenses from his personal funds.130
Discouraged, uncompromising, and unpaid, Edgerton
neglected the work associated with the Superintendent of
128Governor

Sidney S. Edgerton to Secretary of the
Interior James Harlan, March 31, 1866, Letters Received,
Office of Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, Roll 488,
Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA.
129Lincoln

nominated two men to the position of Montana's
Territorial Secretary, both of whom refused the position. See
James McClellan Hamilton, From Wilderness to Statehood, p.282.
Lincoln's murder in April 1865, delayed the issue and his
successor, Andrew Johnson, a Union Democrat, was determined
that a Radical Republican would not be appointed.
130Malone

p. 77.
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Indian affairs duties; work crucial to his political success
in Montana Territory.

The frustrations of the two jobs

created a contempt for the position of superintendent of
Indian affairs.

Sidney Edgerton failed to submit one of the

required annual reports to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs during his tenure as Montana's ex-officio
Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

His actions seemed to

validate the indictment levied by the Doolittle Commission
against the unworkable practice of employing territorial
governors as superintendents of Indian affairs and
highlighted the need to separate these two offices.

The

Commissioners of Indian Affairs, from 1864 through 1866,
complained in their annual reports of a lack of reports
submitted from the Montana Superintendency.

In 1864,

Commissioner William P. Dole wrote, "No reports from the
Governors, who are ex-officio Superintendents of Indian
Affairs for these (Idaho and Montana) Territories, have yet
been received.1,131
The following year, Dole further vented his frustration
towards his office and the ineffectiveness of Congress's
Indian administration when he complained:
First among these is the neglect of many of the
officers responsible to this office to forward
1311864

House Executive Document no.l, 38th Cong., 2d
sess., serial 1220. "Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs" p.172
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their monthly, quarterly, and annual reports at
the proper time, in disregard of repeated
directions from the office.132
He added, "...I do not know of any way to remedy this
difficulty except by reporting to the department each case
of delinquency, and relying upon it to seek a remedy by a
change of officers."133

Dole singled out individuals by

name, and he included Sidney Edgerton in his remarks
describing Montana conditions: "...we have no report, either
this year or last, from Governor Edgerton, ex-officio
superintendent.1,134
In 1866,

Commissioner of Indian Affairs Lewis Vital

Bogy, reported that:
No annual report from this superintendent has been
received. The governor, and ex-officio
superintendent, Ho. Sidney Edgerton, has been
absent from the Territory a considerable portion
of the time, and the general interests of the
service have been in the hands of General Meagher,
secretary and acting governor, who, at last
accounts was about to leave the capital of the
Territory to visit the Flathead agency.135
Governor Edgerton handled Indian Affairs in a
1321865

House Executive Document no. 1, 39th Cong., 1st
sess., serial 1248, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs" p. 121.
133Ibid.,

p. 121.

134Ibid.,

p. 199.

1351866

House Executive Documents no. 1, 39th Cong., 2d
sess., serial 1284, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs" p. 40.
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consistent manner.

He simply did as little as possible.

His uncompromising rigidity ill-served him, his nation, and
his constituents, while he achieved little toward
safeguarding the rights of Indians under his authority.
Governor Edgerton, who, assumed the duties of the
Territorial Governor for Montana Territory but could not
disperse money without a territorial secretary, eagerly
awaited the arrival of newly appointed Territorial
Secretary, Thomas Francis Meagher.136
On August 4, 1865, President Andrew Johnson appointed
Thomas Francis Meagher, a northern Democrat and a minor
Union Civil War General, to Montana's Territorial
Secretaryship.

A dynamic personality, Meagher had been

involved in the revolutionary Young Ireland movement.
Captured by the British and sentenced to be drawn and
quartered for treason in 1848, he cheated his fate when the
sentence was later commuted to banishment in Tasmania.

In

1852, he escaped from Tasmania and came to New York where he
became the editor of the Irish News.

During the American

Civil War he commanded the famous New York Irish Brigade and
led his unit into numerous encounters against Confederate
forces.

Reaching the rank of brigadier general, Meagher

136James L. Thane, ed., A Governor's Wife on the Mining
Frontier: The Letters of Mary Edgerton from Montana, 1863-1865
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Library, Tanner Trust
Fund, 1976) p. 60.
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felt constrained by the War Department's lack of support for
the Irish Brigade's recruiting efforts after its ranks had
been depleted after heavy fighting.

Citing the War

Department's unwillingness to grant him leave to recruit
more volunteers into the Irish Brigade's depleted ranks and
the need to recuperate from a wound he received, Meagher
tendered his military resignation to Lincoln's Secretary of
War Edwin M. Staunton on May 8, 1863, who accepted it a week
later, on May 14th.137
On July 27, 1865, he received President Andrew
Johnson's telegram appointing him to a four-year term as
Territorial Secretary of Montana.

His duties included

recording all legal proceedings in the territorial
legislature, and, more significantly,
...in case of the death, removal,
resignation, or absence of the governor
from the territory, the secretary shall
be, and he is hereby, authorized and
required to execute and perform all the
powers and duties of the governor during
such vacancy or absence..."138
Meagher telegraphed his acceptance two days after
receiving his appointment and began his journey west.
Departing in early August 1865, Meagher reached Bannock the
137Robert G. Athearn, Thomas Francis Meagher: An Irish
Revolutionary in America (New York: Arno Press, 1976) p. 125.
138
138U.S., Statutes at Large, Vol 13, (December 1863
— December 1865) "An Act to provide a temporary government
for the Territory of Montana," 26 May 1864.
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following September.

Traveling to Bannock, Montana

Territory's capital in 1865, was a grueling journey that
involved a great deal of time and inflicted much discomfort
on even the hardiest of travelers.139
Upon his arrival, Edgerton ascertained that Territorial
Secretary Meager was not bonded, and therefore could not
disburse territorial funds.140

This, in turn, meant that

treaty annuities could neither be bought nor dispersed to
the Indians.

Governor Edgerton quickly introduced Meagher

to the local citizens and briefed him on the state of
affairs in the Territory.

Edgerton then left for

Washington, without securing official leave, ostensively to
alert those in the federal government of the money problems
confronting Montana Territory.

His departure placed the job

of acting governor and ex-officio Superintendent of Indian
Affairs in Montana Territory on Meagher's shoulders.141
When Meagher assumed the Territorial Governorship of
Montana, both political parties viewed him as a potential
political ally.

A Union Democrat, the Democrats welcomed

him as one of their own, while his war record endeared him

139Athearn,
140Thane,

Thomas Francis Meagher, p. 14 6.

ed., A Governor's Wife on the Mining Frontier,

p. 60.
141Spence,

p. 34.
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to the Republicans.

Meagher believed that the Democratic

Party in the Territory were riddled with untrustworthy
Confederate sympathizers and aligned himself with the
Territory's Republicans.

Within a few weeks, Meagher,

always a political opportunist, reversed his political
loyalties and joined with the Democrats, the majority Party
and the one which largely comprised the Territory's Irish
citizens.142

Both Meagher and the Territory's Democrats

wanted statehood for Montana.

Meagher's political ambitions

led him to set his sights on becoming the State's Senator.
Montana statehood did not sit well with the country's
Republicans because they feared another Democratic state in
the Union.143
During Meagher's custodianship, confusion reigned in
the halls of Montana's Territorial Government as the Radical
Republican Congressmen in Washington, D.C. declared both of
the Legislatures called by Meagher "null and void."

Montana

Republicans started a campaign of slander and libel against
Meagher depicting him as a hopeless drunk and related ribald
//

stories of his boasting about the numerous conquests he made

142Malone

and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries,

p. 78.
143Ibid.,

p. 80.
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in the executive mansion with ladies of ill-repute.144
The legacy of Edgerton's lackluster stewardship of the
Montana Superintendency left Meagher embroiled in partisan
politics.

This state of affairs, however, did not deter

Meagher from striving for the potential political gain and
the opportunity to recover his past glories that might be
garnered from successfully campaigning in an Indian war.
On October 20, 1865, Meagher requested that Major
General Frank Wheaton, Commander of Montana's military
district, place five hundred cavalry under Meagher's command
to combat both the problem of Indian hostilities as well as
to suppress an estimated 300 road agents.145

His

proclivity towards military action further manifested itself
in a letter to Secretary of State William Seward on December
11, 1865, in which he urged that a cavalry force of at least
1,000 was needed in Montana to quell the Sioux along the
Powder River, and that this force took precedence over the
need of a legislature.146
On December 14, 1865, Meagher reiterated these
sentiments when he wrote to Indian Commissioner Cooley that
he expected little trouble from the tribes in his Territory
144Spence,

Territorial Politics and Government in Montana,

p. 39.
145Athearn,

Thomas Francis Meagher, pp. 147-48.

146Athearn,

Thomas Francis Meagher, p. 148.

90
with the exception of the Sioux.

The Oglala Sioux, under

the leadership of Red Cloud, had started their militarycampaigns against white encroachment on their hunting
grounds along the Bozemen Trail.

Meagher wrote:

As for the Sioux, and their allies and
accomplices, it is my clear and positive
conviction that they will never be
reduced to friendly and reliable
relations with the whites but by the
strong and crushing hand of the military
power of the nation.
I have, in my communication with
the Secretary of State, taken the
liberty of expressing this conviction,
and on the strength of it have requested
him to obtain from the War Department a
competent cavalry force for this
Territory. I trust that you will see
fit to approve of this application which
I have urged in my two-fold capacity as
acting governor and superintendent of
Indian Affairs, and that in the proper
quarter you will give it your ernest
support.147
Meagher was quick to draw sabers against those tribes
like the Sioux whom he felt could not be made to follow the
-'white man's ways.

He also pleaded eloquently for those

tribes he believed were worthy of "civilizing" and whom the
government had neglected.

A case can be made that Meagher

was not someone who "..longed more for glory than for

1471866

House Executive Document no 1, 39th Cong., 2d
sess., serial 1284 "Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs" p. 197.
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Indians."148

Indeed, in many instances his actions served

as a precursor to Grant's Peace Policy.

Territorial

Governor Meagher, in numerous instances, acted as a man of
vision in foreseeing needed Indian policy reforms in Montana
Territory.
Meagher wrote to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Dennis N. Cooley, urging humanitarian action in behalf of
the Territory's non-reservation Shoshoni and Bannock
Indians.

Meagher ordered a Montana political office seeker,

Nathaniel Hall, to investigate their plight.

Hall suggested

building an agency to protect them from their pony stealing
Indian neighbors.

Hall concluded his report with:

The most influential of them feel that the Great
Spirit has so ordered that they must give way to
the palefaces and that the only safety is in
throwing themselves into the hands of the Great
Chief at Washington asking that he will throw his
big robe of protection over them untill fsicl they
fulfill the destination for which they were
created.149
Meagher agreed wholeheartedly with Hall and forwarded
his finding with the following to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs:

148Toole,

Montana: An Uncommon Land, between PP. 126 and
127, caption with pictures of Major General George Armstrong
Custer and General Thomas Francis Meagher, "Two Headstrong
Generals."
149Nathaniel

Hall to Governor Thomas Francis Meagher,
April 6, 1866, Letters Received, Office of Indian Affairs,
Montana Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA.
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At the moment I write, there are eleven lodges
belonging to them standing close to town
(Bannock), and they contain as much misery and
filth and dire want as might be exceeded only by
the huts of the Terra del Fuegans.
He urged the Commissioner that these "poor creatures" be
formed into an agency.

"Unrecognized, unprotected, and

outlawed, as it were, as they are now, they are indeed a
revolting reproach to our civilization."

Of course, he

nominated Hall to head this proposed Agency.150
In the same letter, he reported Blackfeet depredations
in a more familiar vein:
There is, however, no hope whatever to
be entertained that such outrages will
cease until the presence of a military
force in the Territory, judiciously
distributed and posted, shall , by
intimidation, coerce these intractable
savages to do what no treaty, however
liberal, and no amount of annuities
will, in my opinion, induce them to
do.151
Meagher astutely perceived that one man could not give
the attention required of Governor and Superintendent of
Indian Affairs in Montana because the agencies were
separated from between two and three hundred miles.

In a

wise move, he nominated Flathead Agent Gad Upson for the
position of full-time Superintendent in Montana because of

1501866

House Executive Document no.l, 39th Cong., 2d
sess., serial 1284. p. 199.
151Ibid.,
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his wealth of experience in Indian matters.

To defuse

hostilities between the whites and the tribesmen, Meagher
proposed that a commission be appointed which would
investigate and adjudicate claims by awarding compensation
to those parties suffering loss from Indian attacks.152
The Federal Government ignored an opportunity to allay
tensions between the two peoples, when they refused to
ratify a treaty negotiated by Blackfeet Agent Gad Upson and
acting Governor Thomas Francis Meagher with the Blackfeet
and Gros Ventre Tribes at Fort Benton on November 16, 1865.
Under the terms of the treaty, the Blackfeet agreed to cede
the lands south of the Missouri River and withdraw
northward, away from white settlements, in return for
annuities.153
Congress never ratified the "Upson" Treaty.

Almost

immediately after its singing, Blackfeet braves stole horses
from the whites, an act which the tribesmen considered
heroic. Compounding this crime, Piegan and Blood war parties
killed a number of miners and traders within two months of

152Thomas

Francis Meagher to William Seward, Dec 14, 1865,
Letters received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana
Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA.
153A
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the council meeting.154

When information of these events

reached Secretary of the State William Seward, he became
convinced that neither side would abide by the treaty's
terms.

Although the "Upson" Treaty held the promise of

peace between the two peoples, Seward did not submit it to
the Senate for ratification.155
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dennis Cooley supported
the Secretary of State's decision in this matter.

Cooley

spoke out against the treaty because he had information that
the tribesmen had "...almost immediately broken out into
hostility, and thus violated their treaty stipulations."156
Although Congress did not ratify the treaty, officials in
the Indian Service acted as if it had been ratified and held
the tribes accountable to its terms.
When Agent Upson died suddenly in San Francisco enroute
to Washington to deliver the Blackfeet Treaty that he and
Meagher had negotiated and singed on November 16, 1865,
Meagher wrote President Andrew Johnson and urged him to make
the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Montana a full-time
position, and to separate the office from that of the
154Ewers,

The Blackfeet, p. 240.

155Malone

and Roeder, Montana: A History of Two Centuries,

p. 90.
1561866

House Executive Documents no. 1, 39th Cong., 2d
sess., serial 1284, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs" p. 13.
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governor's.

Meagher suggested himself for the position,

noting that it would be "far more in consonance with my
predilections than either the Secretaryship or
Governorship.11157
Meagher, known as the "acting one", was relieved of his
role as acting governor with the arrival of Territorial
Governor Green Clay Smith in October 1866.

At the urging of

the legislature, on January 3, 1867, Governor Smith, with
less than three months in office, returned to Washington to
persuade Congress of Montana's need for more military
protection.

In his absence, Meagher once again resumed his

duties as acting governor and ex-officio Superintendent of
Indian Affairs, and once again chaos returned.158
Sidney Edgerton's tenure from 1864 -1866 as Montana's
Territorial Governor/ex-officio Superintendent of Indian
Affairs can only be described as a failure.

The reasons for

his failure were recognized by many leaders, but Congress
failed to rectify the problems.

Like so many of the

politicians appointed to territorial office, Edgerton viewed
his position as temporary in nature and as a stepping stone
to further his career.

Even had that not been the case,

Congress never gave Edgerton the wherewithal properly to
157Athearn,
158Malone

p. 80.

Thomas Francis Meagher, pp. 154-155.
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execute his duties.

When Secretary Meagher came to Montana,

Edgerton gave him the briefest of briefings and left the
Territory as quickly as possible.

He turned the reigns of

government over to a man who, although capable of
recognizing problems with the administration of Indian
Affairs, was also ill-suited to hold the position.
It would be unjustifiable to hold one man accountable
for this tragedy.

The system that evolved through practice

and legislation proved inadequate.

The government's policy

was to assimilate the Indian peacefully, and instead, it
produced hostility and open warfare.
with the Indians grew worse.

If anything, relations

The office of ex-officio

superintendent failed to achieve its objectives.

Edgerton,

and especially his successor Meagher, recognized and
suggested constructive means to improve the Territory's
Indian Administration.

In the absence of constructive

reform, however, one man, Edgerton, neglected his office and
the other, Meagher, abused it.

CHAPTER IV
GOVERNORS SMITH AND ASHLEY: 1866-1868

Montana Territory had an easy birth, but a difficult
infancy.

The problems that frustrated Edgerton and Meagher

continued to plague their successors.
the Territory's politics.

Factionalism plagued

The predominately Democratic

population resented the appointed Radical Republican
governor Edgerton, who, overwhelmed by the office, ignored
Indian affairs and had so stubbornly clung to his
uncompromising political principals that he completely
alienated the majority of his constituents.

After briefing

his newly arrived Territorial Secretary, Thomas Francis
Meagher, for one week, Edgerton left Montana Territory to
lobby on behalf of the Territory's interests in Washington
D.C.

Meagher, an opportunistic man of fickle political

loyalties, took over the office in Edgerton's absence.

His

claim to the gubernatorial office was held up to such public
ridicule that he was saddled with the derogatory appellation
of the "Acting One."
Sidney Egerton's approach to Indian affairs in the
fledgling Territory consisted primarily of ignoring them as
much as was possible.

His successor, Meagher, expressed

some interest in Indian affairs and recommended that
97
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Congress create an independent Superintendent of Indian
Affairs for Montana Territory.
forward for the post.

Meagher then put himself

His designs upon the independent

Superintendency should be attributed to his propensity for
self-aggrandizement rather than to any great benevolent
concern for the Territory's tribesmen.

However, Meagher's

suggestion was a step in the right direction.
This undistinguished background set the stage for
Montana's last two territorial governors/ex-officio
superintendents of Indian affairs.
Green Clay Smith from Kentucky.

The first of these was

Born on July 2, 1832 in

Richmond Kentucky, Smith graduated from Transylvania
University's law school, Lexington, Kentucky in 1850.
While serving in the Kentucky legislature in 1860, he
took a strong stand against secession.

To underscore his

commitment to the Union, he resigned his seat and enlisted
in the Union Army in 1861 as a private.
came rapidly.

Smith's promotions

By the early part of 1862, he had attained

the rank of colonel, and by June of the same year he was
commissioned a brigadier general.

In 1863, he resigned his

commission in order to serve as Representative from Kentucky
in the 38th and 39th Congress.

A popular congressman with

an outstanding military record, Smith nearly became
Lincoln's running mate in the 1864 election, but lost the
nomination to Andrew Johnson, a Unionist Democrat from
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Tennessee.

Towards the end of the Civil War, in March 1865,

Smith was brevetted Major General of the Volunteers for
gallantry in the field.159
Johnson appointed Smith as the Governor of Montana
Territory on July 13, 1866.

Smith accepted the position,

and arrived in the Territorial Capital on October 3rd of
that year.160
Smith fit the mold of many territorial governors, at
least as he fulfilled his duties as Superintendent of Indian
Affairs.

Indeed, he could be compared with Washington's

Isaac Stevens.

A popular Territorial Governor, as well as

moral, sober, and a capable man of considerable talent and
energy, Smith's record as ex-officio superintendent of
Indian affairs, like Steven's, remained poor.

In his first

address to the Territorial Legislature, delivered on
November 6, 1866, the Governor announced a hard line policy
against those Indians he deemed hostile.

Smith, like

Meagher before him, directly expressed his dislike of the
Sioux, who "...had scarcely made a treaty with the
government, than they leaped upon the warpath, and in
conjunction with other tribes with whom we had a right to
159McMullin

and Walker, Biographical Directory of American
Territorial Governors, p.212.
160James

E. Calloway, "Governor Green Clay Smith, 18661868," Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana,
Vol. 5, 1904, p.113.
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expect peace, murdered and plundered our people."161
He continued:
If the Government will help us, we will be glad,
and heartily co-operate; but if not, we must take
the matter in our own hands, and teach the red man
that he cannot with impunity kill and rob. We
will be just and fair to them, but they must
respect our rights.162
One element of that "right" which Smith referred to was the
perceived need of the whites for "...all the agricultural
land for cultivation."163
In general, Smith paid scant attention to Indian
affairs.

His hard line position remained unchanged.

In his

second address to the Montana Territorial Legislature he
lamented the conduct of some of the militia.

When General

Alfred Terry, under pressure from the Federal Government,
mustered out the Montana Territorial Militia, many enlistees
and officers stole government animals and equipment.

Smith,

however, still expressed "a debt of gratitude" for those who
served faithfully and well.

He went on to expand upon his

belief in the importance of an efficient militia to defend
the country against "...marauding and desperate bands of

161Green

Clay Smith, "Governor Green Clay Smith's
Message," Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana,
Vol. 5, 1904, p. 137.
162Ibid.,

pp. 137-38.

163Ibid.,

p. 137.
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Indians."164

This statement constituted his sole reference

to Indian policy or problems in Montana Territory.165
Montana's politics remained rife with bitter
factionalism stemming from the problems created by
Republican appointed judges and elected legislatures
controlled by the Democrats.

In this political morass.

Governor Smith applied for an official leave of absence and
spent the first half of 1867 in Washington lobbying for
Montana's interests.

Smith's departure meant that the reins

of the Montana Territory's Government once again lay in the
hands of a territorial secretary, acting as governor and exofficio superintendent.

Thomas Francis Meagher, a man who

had already proven himself both ambitious and unable to
bridge the Territory's partisan politics, again found
himself in the governor's office.166
Meagher's first tenure as acting governor in 1866 had
failed to provide him an opportunity either to secure a
permanent political position or to win the glory needed to

164Green

Clay Smith "Second Message of Governor Green Clay
Smith" Contributions to the Historical Society of Montana,
Vol. 5, 1904, pp. 142.
165
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propel him into the spotlight of national prominence.
Meagher was a different man from the year before.
Frustrated that his career had reached a dead end, he had
wanted to resign the Territorial Secretaryship when Governor
Smith arrived, but Smith talked him into staying in the
office.

On April 16 1867, when Meagher was acting governor,

the murder of John Bozemen and the wounding of Thomas Cover
in an attack by Blackfeet Indians in the Gallitin Valley,
provided Meagher with what he must have considered was his
last opportunity to save himself from obscurity.167

Gone

was Meagher the statesman of 18 66 who had advocated viable
changes in the administration of Indian policy.

In his

stead emerged "Commander" Meagher, determined to secure fame
as an Indian fighter.
Meagher's Civil War experience demonstrated to him that
waging an aggressive war and fighting it to a successful
conclusion could provide the fame necessary to secure a
political appointment.

Meagher decided to portray Bozemen's

murder at the hands of five Blackfeet warriors as a major
Indian uprising that he, as Commander in Chief of the
Montana Territorial militia, would quell.168
On April 24, "Commander" Meagher held a war meeting and
167M.A.

Leeson, History of Montana: 1739 - 1885, (Chicago:
Warner, Beers & Co., 1885), p. 119.
168Athearn,

"Early Territorial Montana," p. 17.
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rally in Helena.

Generally, the settlers in the Territory

thought the tribesmen should be punished.

Montana's

experience in Indian warfare up to that time had been a
series of depredations, involving horse and cattle theft, as
well as isolated killings.

Meagher played on their demands

for retribution and their disgust with the "Christian-like
character of the United States troops in the West"
create a Territorial militia.169

to

Always a flamboyant

speaker, Meagher called for 600 volunteers who would save
the Territory from the red scourge.

Although the idea of a

Territorial Militia appealed to many Montanans, when it came
to committing themselves to an Indian campaign, most of the
settlers were too busily engaged in mining activities to
play soldier.

Meagher's call to arms came at the beginning

of the mining season, the number of those Montanans who
enlisted in Meagher's campaign proved disappointing.170
Indeed, not everyone in Montana Territory agreed with
Meagher as to the necessity of an Indian War over Bozemen's
death.

Some saw through the thinly disguised reasons for

going to war.

Augustus H. Chapman, Flathead Indian Agent,

wrote:
Acting Governor Meagher's Indian war in
Montana is the biggest humbug of the age, got up
169Leeson,

History of Montana, p. 118.

170Athearn,

"Early Territorial Montana," p. 18.
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to advance his political interest, and to enable a
lot of bummers who surround and hang onto him to
make a big raid on the United States
treasury...171
In spite of poor enlistment and various criticisms, Meagher
plunged on with his Indian war.

On July 1, while at Fort

Benton awaiting supplies and arms, Meagher fell off the deck
of a riverboat and drowned.

"Commander" Meagher led neither

a single charge in Montana Territory nor took a single
tribesmen's scalp.

Despite a $2,000 reward and an extensive

search, Meagher's body was never recovered from the murky
depths of the Missouri River.172
Governor Smith returned to Montana from Washington,
D.C. in June, 1867.

Upon Meagher's death, he took control

of the newly organized militia in order to fight the Sioux
and Blackfeet Indians.

Writing to Commissioner of Indian

Affairs upon his return to Montana Territory, Smith offered
his explanation of his position as he perceived it:
I am here as Governor and ex-officio
Superintendent of Indian Affairs. My duties are
two-fold — first to secure peaceable and
amicable relations with the Indians if I can, (if
I have the means and which I am perfectly willing
to do) but forcibly if I must which I also am
willing to do, and I have the means to do the

1711867
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latter.173
This letter returned to the theme of Smith's first address
to the Territorial Legislature.

Because the federal

government failed to supply those means the Governor deemed
necessary to the peaceful settlement of Indian affairs in
his Territory, he employed the means at hand, the local
militia, and attempted to force peace through the use of
violence.
Montana's Territorial Militia accomplished little
militarily.

They marched through the Galatin Valley to the

Yellowstone in May.

In July they fought with a party of

Crows who had stolen some livestock, and killed two
tribesmen.

In August, Blackfeet raided stations along the

Northern Overland Mailroute at Fort Benton, stealing horses
and one mail bag.

In the same month, a captain of one unit

killed a man in his command after the man attacked him.174
Despite this poor performance, Montana Territory,
unabashedly "made a big raid on the Treasury" and submitted
an enormous bill to the federal government for its services.
Smith professed great embarrassment when many of the
additional militia which he had organized decamped with
173Green Clay Smith to Nathaniel G. Taylor, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, July 29, 1867, Letters received, Office of
Indian Affairs, Montana Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy
234, RG 75, NA.
174Leeson,

History of Montana, pp. 123-24.
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horses, mules and supplies.175
On June 20, 1867, Congress, frustrated with the
inability of current Indian policy to keep peace on the
frontier, authorized a commission to look into matters and
recommend changes.

This investigative committee, the

Doolittle Commission, consisted of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, Nathaniel Green Taylor; the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Samuel F. Tappen; and
former general John Sanborn.

President Andrew Johnson, whom

the commission charged with appointing three military
representatives, selected Lieutenant General William T.
Sherman, Major General William S. Harney, and Major General
Alfred Terry.176
The cornerstone of the Peace Commission's policy
centered upon the settlement of the "wild" tribes west of
the Mississippi River onto reservations.

They concluded a

number of treaties negotiated in whirlwind fashion with the
Sioux, Comanches, Kiowas, Blackfeet, and Cheyennes.

These

treaties established two vast reservation complexes, to be
held by these tribes in perpetuity.

The northernmost lay in

present day South Dakota, while the southern reservation was

175Calloway,
176Robert
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pp.121-22.

G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the
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1956) p. 172.
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situated in Oklahoma.

Other provisions contained in these

treaties called for the distribution of annuities, the
introduction of schools for Indian children, and the
establishment of schools designed to teach agricultural
techniques to the tribesmen.

Unfortunately, the Senate's

lack of action in ratifying these treaties compelled the
Cheyennes, Kiowas, and Comanches, who had already
surrendered their old lands, once again to take to the
warpath.

As a direct consequence of the Senate's inability

or unwillingness to ratify these treaties, the West, from
the Rio Grande to the Canadian Border, blazed into flames
with yet more Indian wars.177
Despite of the Senate's inability to act, in 1868, the
Doolittle Commission issued a very lengthy report which
recommended a number of modifications and improvements to
existing Federal Indian policy.

The Doolittle Commission's

Report provided a foundation upon which President Grant
based his Peace Policy of 1869.

Perhaps most significant,

the Commission recommended that governors of territories no
longer act in the capacity of ex-officio superintendents of
Indian Affairs.

The Commission also recommended that

militia not be used to wage war with the Indians.

It

alluded to both the disastrous Sand Creek Massacre in
177Utley
/

pp. 122-24.

"The Celebrated Peace Policy of General Grant,"
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Colorado, as well as to the fact that "A regiment of Montana
troops last September would have involved us in an almost
interminable war with the Crows but for the timely
intervention of the military authorities."178

The latter

incident referred to Meagher and Smith's trumped up Indian
war of the previous year.

The Doolittle Report signaled a

move on the part of the federal government toward greater
centralization and tighter control over the management of
Indian affairs.

The days of superintendents and

superintendencies grew short from this point.

Montana's

short experience directly contributed to this far-reaching
policy change.
This new Federal activism in dealing with Indian
affairs became manifest when on April 15, 1868, President
Johnson appointed William J. Cullen as Special Indian Agent
in Montana.

Cullen's mission was to

...negotiate treaties with such of the tribes of
Montana Territory as maybe advisable with a view
to extinguishment of the title to the lands
claimed by them, and to their locations upon
suitable reservations.179
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Cullen's first hand experience with Indian affairs
seemed to especially qualify him for the job of special
agent.

He had served as the former Commissioner for the

State of Minnesota during the Sioux uprising in 1862.
Commissioner Cullen received much credit for successfully
handling the situation.180

Cullen's course of action to

preserve the peace in Montana Territory, particularly with
the Blackfeet who had not received their promised annuities
and whose lands were being overrun with white immigrants,
involved honoring the terms of the existing treaties in the
same manner as the Blackfeet honored them.

Because the

Missouri River was running low in 1868, many whites would
travel by land through Blackfeet hunting grounds, thus
making the situation between whites and Indians even more
explosive.

Cullen believed that the best solution involved

placing the Blackfeet on farms.

This action would then

remove the Blackfeet from the vicinity of Fort Benton
"...where there is so much to excite and exasperate
them."181
In the typical rapid fire succession of the Peace
180James

M. Cavanaugh, Delegate from Montana Territory, to
Nathaniel G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, March 11,
1868, Letters received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana
Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA.
181W.J.
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Commission's Indian Treaty negotiations, Cullen managed to
sign treaties with the Gros Ventre on July 13, 1868, the
River Crow on July 15, 1868, and the Blackfeet on September
1, 1868.

"The provisions and stipulations agreed upon" in

these treaties were "substantially the same as those
proposed in the Treaty of 1865, known as the Upson
Treaty.1,182
Efforts to establish peaceful relations with the
Indians faced considerable obstacles.

The Indian Service

lacked a manageable chain of command, and the Indian
Service, rife with corruption, was ill-served by many of
those who worked within it.

Although generally popular with

his constituents in Montana Territory, Governor Smith had
detractors within the Indian Service.

Blackfeet Indian

Agent George B. Wright accused the Governor of incompetence
and mismanagement of funds.

On June 11, 1868, Wright wrote

to Commissioner of Indian Affairs N.G. Taylor and accused
the Governor of using $1,800 appropriated to the Blackfeet
Agency for gambling purposes.183

Wright must have been an

impetuous man, because four days later he wrote to Taylor
182Charles E. Mix, acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
to W.T. Otto, Acting Secretary of the Interior, September 8,
1868, Letters received, Office of Indian Affairs, Montana
Superintendency, Roll 488, Microcopy 234, RG 75, NA.
183George

B. Wright to N.G Taylor, June 11, 1868, Letters
Received, State Department Territorial Papers, Montana, 186472, Roll 401, Microcopy T254, RG 75, NA.
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reversing himself.

In a letter dated June 15, 1868, Wright

informed Taylor that he had been misled when he accused
Smith of official misconduct due to the fact that the people
who had related the story to him were Smith's personal and
political enemies.184
Smith went east in the summer of 18 68, and never
returned to Montana.

Until his successor, Benjamin Franklin

Potts arrived in mid-summer 1869, Territorial Secretary
James Tufts served as Acting Governor and ex-officio
Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

After leaving Montana

Territory, Smith devoted himself to the Baptist ministry.
He briefly returned to public life in 1876, when the
Prohibition Party delegates unanimously nominated him to run
as their presidential candidate.

As a third party

candidate, Smith managed to garner 9,522 popular votes.185
James M. Ashley served next as Montana's Territorial
Governor.

Born on November 14, 1822, in Allegheny County,

Pennsylvania, Ashley received little formal schooling.

He

studied law under Charles 0. Tracey before gaining admission
to the bar in 1849.

Ashley held a number of positions

including editor of the Democrat in Portsmith, Ohio in 1848.

184George B. Wright to N.G Taylor, June 15, 1868, Letters
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Traveling to Toledo in 1851, he engaged himself in both boat
construction and in the pharmaceutical business.

During

these years, Ashley gave considerable assistance to runaway
slaves.186
In 1858, Ashley, an avid student of politics, won a
seat in the House of Representatives as a Republican
Ohio.

from

He quickly associated himself with the most radical

of Republicans, or "Black Republicans", who refused to
compromise their anti-slavery position.

He befriended the

influential Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, and
thus, Ashley became the Chairman of the Committee on
Territories.
created.

Under his tenure the Territory of Montana was

Congressman Ashley emerged as one of the more

influential members of the Radical Reconstructionists and
became a leader in the movement to impeach President Andrew
Johnson.187
Ashley lost his bid for re-election in 1869.

Shortly

after Grant's inauguration, on April 27, 1869, the new
president Grant nominated Ashley as Territorial Governor of
Montana.

The nomination, waa controversial, and it passed

186Charles

S. Ashley, "Governor Ashley's Biography and
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the Senate by only one vote.188

Ashley arrived in the

Territory in mid-summer and set up his residence in Helena,
although Virginia City still remained the Territory's
official capital.189
Ashley's tenure began less than an auspiciously.

By

delaying his departure from Washington, D.C. and dallying in
the Capital for a considerable length of time, he had caused
some concern in official circles.

The former Collector of

Interior Revenue, H. Case, wrote President Ulysses S. Grant
on June 25, 1869, to inform the President that Ashley had
not yet departed for Montana Territory and was using his
time in Washington to attend private and public meetings
ostensibly for the purposes of inducing immigrants to the
Territory.

In reality, Case reported, these meetings were,

"for electioneering purposes, tending to perpetuate strife
and division in the Republican Party of the District."190
Governor Ashley fit the mold of those Territorial
Governors appointed to their positions solely for political

188See
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p. 189, and Clark C. Spence, "Spoilsman in Montana," Montana,
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reasons.

Strong opposition as well as support existed for

Ashley among the citizens in Montana Territory.
his political support was not broadly based.

Moreover,

His support or

lack thereof followed strict, deeply drawn Republican or
Democratic Party lines.191
By 1869, and the beginning of President Ulysses S.
Grant's administration, few members of government could with
any assurance argue that the nation's Indian Policy had not
totally and completely failed.

Grant, the nation's number

one military man, inaugurated his Peace Policy, or, as it is
sometimes erroneously called, the Quaker Policy.

The Peace

Policy is often mistakenly confused with the Peace
Commission, an entirely different Federal initiative,
enacted by the Johnson Administration in 1867 .192
Ashley, in his sole address to Montana's Territorial
Legislature, clearly expressed his contempt for and
disinterest in Montana Territory's tribesmen in particular,
and Indian affairs in general, when he stated:
The practical working of our Indian policy
from the organization of the government to this
time, has been an offense against civilization.
As I have but little hope of seeing a change in
our Indian policy while an Indian survives, I make

191Spence,

"Spoilsman in Montana, 11 p. 28.

192Utley, "The Celebrated Peace Policy of General Grant,"
p. 121.
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no suggestions touching Indian affairs.193
In the same address, the Governor expressed his contempt for
the treaty system and called on all western citizens to
demand that their national government cease making treaties
with the Indians, giving "the right of any tribe or band of
wandering savages to make war or peace at pleasure."194
Although Grant appointed Ashley Territorial Governor of
Montana in April 1869, Ashley never received the chance to
serve as ex-officio superintendent of Indian affairs.

On

June 1, 1869, shortly after Ashley's appointment, Congress
created an independent Indian superintendency for Montana
Territory that functioned separately from and outside of,
the office of the Territorial Governor.

Montana's

Territorial Governors never again served as ex-officio
superintendents of Indian affairs.195
The hypocrisy, perpetuated by Territorial Governors
Edgerton, Meagher, and Smith (Ashley would likely have
followed suit) when they paid lip service to Indian affairs
as ex-officio superintendents of Indian Affairs had ended.
With the creation of an independent superintendency, the
antagonistic policy objectives of the governor and
193Ashley,

"Governor Ashley's Biography and Messages" p.

285.
194Ibid.,
195Hill,

p. 284.

The Office of Indian Affairs, p.101.
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superintendent surfaced, and Ashley, as Territorial
Governor, could openly and without reservation, champion the
interests of the Territory's white voters over the
tribesmen.
Ashley was denied the opportunity to display his
talents as Montana's Territorial Governor.

Grant, for

reasons never made public, relieved Ashley of the position
in December 1869.196

The political climate which had

motivated Grant to appoint Ashley had changed, and Ashley
was dismissed.

There is little doubt that Grant made the

correct decision in dismissing Ashley from office.
fiery brand of Radical Republicanism
than Edgerton's.

Ashley's

burned more vehemently

His Indian policy, even though he was

officially removed from making or implementing it, appeared
to be even more uncaring and uninspiring than that of his
predecessors.

In the interim, Montana's Territorial

Secretary, Wiley S. Schribner acted as Territorial Governor
until the arrival of Grant's next appointee, Benjamin
Franklin Potts, who reached Montana Territory in late August
1870.

Ashley, who lived for another twenty-five years,

never again held public office.197

196Ashley,

"Governor Ashley's Biography and Messages" p.

194.
197McMullin

and Walker, Biographical
American Territorial Governors, p. 214.
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By 1869, as part and policy of President Johnson's
Peace Committee, military personnel had replaced most of the
civilian agents, whom the government summarily suspended.
Johnson gave way to Grant on March 4, 1869.

In his

inaugural address, Grant stated: "The proper treatment of
the original inhabitants of this land -the Indians - is one
deserving of careful study.

I will favor any course towards

them which tends to their civilization and ultimate
citizenship."198

In keeping with these sentiments

expressed in his inaugural address, the following year,
President Ulysses S. Grant reversed Johnson's policy of
using military personnel as Indian agents.

Under Grant,

civilians associated with religious bodies, most noticeably
the Society of Friends, or Quakers, replaced the military
men.

Common practice, however, continued to allow the

temporary appointment of military officers as Indian agents,
particularly hostile areas.199
The reforms of Grant's Peace Policy concentrated on the
selection of superintendents and agents hoping the churches
would provide honest men.

In his Annual Report for 1870,

Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano looked back over

198Wesley

C. Wilson, "The U.S. Army and the Piegans: The
Baker Massacre on the Marias, 1870." North Dakota History,
Vol. 32, No. 1, January, 1965. p. 41.
199Hill,

The Office of Indian Affairs, p.3.
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the previous year since the inauguration of Grant's Peace
policy, and wrote the following:
The tribes in Nebraska and Kansas, and some of
those most recently placed upon the reservations
in the Indian Territory, were placed under the
control of members of the Society of Friends; the
others were given in charge of military personnel,
who were waiting orders under the laws for the
reduction of the army.200
The Secretary went on to explain that "changes were made
because it was believed that the public opinion of the
country demanded a radical re-organization of this branch of
the service."201

According to Secretary Delano, the

selection of the officers to hold position in the Indian
service, "...was made partly for economic reasons, as they
were on pay though not on duty, and the salaries of many
civil officers could thus be saved, and partly because it
was believed they furnished a corps of public servants whose
integrity and faithfulness could be relied upon, and in whom
the public was prepared to have confidence."202
The Grant administration turned to religious
organizations in an attempt to eliminate corruption and
patronage while stressing civil, as opposed to military
2OO1870

House Executive Document no. 1, pt. 2, 41st Cong.,
3d sess., serial 1449, "Annual Report of the Secretary of the
Interior, 1870." p. x.
201Ibid.

202Ibid.
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relations with the Indian.
The Friends (Quakers) were appointed not
because they were believed to have any monopoly of
honesty or good will towards the Indians, but
because their selection would of itself be
understood by the country to indicate the policy
adopted, namely, the sincere cultivation of
peaceful relations with the tribes, and the choice
of agents who did not, for personal profit, seek
the service, but were sought for it because they
were at least deemed fit for its duties...203
A major impetus behind Grant's Peace Policy lay in the need
to defuse the public's cries of corruption and mismanagement
in the handling by the government of Indian Affairs.
Grant's Peace Policy featured two main elements.

In

addition to appointing members of religious orders as Indian
Agents, Congress authorized a commission of philanthropic
citizens, outside of the government, who would advise the
government in matters concerning Indian policy.

More

important, these civilian advisors were authorized by
executive order to "...inspect all the accounts and records
of the Bureau, to be present at the purchases of Indian
goods and advise them to the conduct of the same, and to
visit and inspect the tribes in their reservations and
examine the business of all the agencies."204

These two

elements of the Peace Policy were designed, by substituting
new officers selected by a different criteria and organizing
203Ibid.
204Ibid.

pp. x-xi.
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an official body to perform inspections, to reform the
Indian Bureau, and, at the same time, to prevent any more
Indian uprisings.

Grant's program also intended to end the

partisan political natures of superintendents.

Ironically

for a president whose own administration suffered from
cronyism and corruption, Grant tried to eliminate these
vices from the Indian Service.
By 1867, it had become clear that the Indian Service as
well as Indian policy needed reform.

By 1868, the wounds of

the Civil War, if not healed, were less now, and the nation,
trying to put the conflict behind it, had the energy and
resources to look west and implement the reforms.

Many

adhered to the "safety valve" theory, which held that
regardless of the adversity, a man could move out west and
start anew.

Therefore, the west had to be made safe for

immigrants starting new lives.

In order to open the lands

for settlement, the title to Indian lands had to be secured
and extended.

In addition, the Indians had to be

aculturalized to make the land safe.

The Doolittle

Commission recognized that having territorial governors
serve as ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs
created problems and thus impeded the settlement of the
West.

It therefore recommended that the two positions be

separated.

Grant recognized the inability of warfare to

subdue the "wild" tribes and inaugurated his "Peace Policy",
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which placed those affiliated with religious orders as heads
of Indian agencies, and played down the role of federal
troops in implementing Indian policy.

As radical as the

reforms enacted in the Indian Bureau appeared, relations
between Indians and whites had changed little.

CHAPTER V
THE MONTANA SUPERINTENDENCY:
JUNE 1, 1869 - JUNE 30, 1873

With Major Alfred Sully'" s appointment as Superintendent
of Indian Affairs on June 1, 1869, the territorial governor
was freed from his responsibility as ex-officio
superintendent of Indian affairs.

However, many of the same

problems were carried over, and Indian-American relations
did not improve.

Indeed, they worsened.

By the time

Congress appointed Sully, the Montana Superintendency, under
the territorial governor as ex-officio superintendent of
Indian affairs, had so exacerbated Indian relations through
neglect, that it was too late to improve them.

This led to

a major restructuring of the administration of Indian
affairs. Congress abolished the Montana Superintendency, and
thereafter Indian agents reported directly to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington D.C.
The territorial governors' role as ex-officio
superintendents of Indian affairs has been largely ignored
by historians mainly because the territorial governors
ignored the role themselves.

Sidney Edgerton did not submit

one annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
even though submission was required and Edgerton was paid to
122
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do so.
Edgerton cannot be singled out as the only culprit.
Governors Thomas Francis Meagher and Green Clay Smith were
more than ready to take to the field against marauding
Indians.

Were they willing to organize a militia to protect

the Indians rights from transgressing whites?
not.

To do so would have been impossible.

Of course

Edgerton at

least recognized white transgressions against the Indians as
one of the main problems in keeping peace with the Indians,
Yet even he would have been powerless to enact a policy to
protect Indian rights.
And what of the qualifications of these men to hold
office as ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs?
Edgerton, Meagher and Smith never saw an Indian until they
reached Montana.
their charges.

These men were completely ignorant of

Appointed by the President to their position

usually as a reward for political favors, appointees to the
territorial governorship viewed their positions as temporary
and as stepping stones to a more favored or lucrative
political position, usually to the United States Senate.
The quickest way to these better positions was to push white
immigration to secure the requisite number of voters for
statehood.

The surest method to entice immigration involved

securing title to the Indian lands that could then be opened
up to white settlement.
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Congress with its niggardly appropriations to the
territories can be blamed for a great many problems with
Indian/American relations.

After placing the tribesmen on

reservations, we have seen how the slowness or inability to
deliver promised annuity goods enraged the Indians, who took
to stealing horses and cattle in order to survive.

As these

depredations continued against white property, isolated
killing occurred and settlers called for military action.
Coloradans and Montanans formed their own militia to extract
revenge on Indians, with disastrous results for the
relations between Indians and whites.
However, the appointment of a professional, independent
superintendent of Indian affairs in Montana Territory did
not appreciably change matters.
common problem.

Alfred Sully recognized a

Writing in his annual report to the

commissioner of Indian Affairs, he stated:
...no appropriation(s have been) made for these
(Blackfeet) Indians last year, and in consequence
there is nothing coming to them this year - not
even their usual very small amount of annuity
goods.205
When faced with starvation on a reservation, the
Indians, took to raiding livestock.

On August 17, 1869,

members of the Piegan Tribe, part of the Blackfeet

2051869

House Executive Document no. 1, 41st Cong., 2d
sess., serial 1414. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs." p. 732.
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Confederacy, had killed rancher/trader Malcolm Clark and his
son.

Although there were extenuating circumstances behind

the murder, (Clark, a brash man with an abusive personality
had humiliated one of the Indians) Montanans demanded the
guilty parties be punished.

Officials of the Indian Bureau

made the effort to induce friendly Blackfeet chiefs to turn
over the guilty parties.

When the chiefs were unable to

comply, retaliation became inevitable.206
The resulting "Piegan Massacre" led by Colonel Eugene
M. Baker ranks with the "Sand Creek Massacre" of Colorado's
John Chivington.

Under orders to "strike them hard," Baker

and troops of the Second Cavalry from Fort Shaw and Fort
Ellis, fell on Chief Heavy Runner's camps in the freezing
dawn on January 23, 1870.

Heavy Runner was killed waving a

piece of paper given to him by an Indian agent stating he
was not a "hostile."207

Baker's official report on the

incident, dated February 18, 1870, curiously failed to break
down the one hundred and seventy-three Indians killed by age
or sex.208

Lieutenant William B. Pease, Blackfeet Indian

Agent from June 11, 1869 - September 9, 1870, as part of a

206Wilson,
207Ibid.,
2081869

"The U.S. Army and the Piegans, "

pp. 47-49.

pp. 50-51.

- 1870 House Executive Document no. 1, 41st Cong.,
2d sess., serial 1419. "Expedition Against Piegan Indians."
p. 2.
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standard report, broke down the casualties as follows: "173
killed - 33 men, of which 15 were young or fighting men; 90
women; and 55 children."209
Baker and the Second Cavalry were hailed as heroes in
Montana.

Indeed, the Piegans, decimated by war and small

pox, resigned themselves to life on the reservation from
that moment forward.

The reaction in the East was quite

different, and this tragic incident on the Marias River in a
remote part of a remote territory, had profound effects.

In

accordance with Section 18 of the Army Appropriation Act of
July 15, 1870, Congress ended the policy of offering army
officers to serve as Indian agents or superintendents.

As a

consequence, Major General Alfred Sully was replaced by Mr.
Jasper A. Viall on September 9, 1870.

Congress reversed the

policy of putting military men in charge of Indian Bureau
facilities.

The Indian Department Appropriation Act of

March 3, 1871 reversed the policy of treating the Indians as
sovereign nations.

This cleared the way for the Federal

Government to take charge of the Indians as wards of the
state and to provide for their welfare, not as members of a
foreign state, but rather as part of the general population
and as potential citizens.210

209Wilson,
210Ibid.,

"The U.S. Army and the Piegans,"

pp. 55-56.

p. 51.
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The experience of Montana's territorial governors as
ex-officio superintendents of Indian affairs provides an
insight into the problem of territorial governors serving as
superintendents of Indian affairs.

The contradiction in

duties between the two offices made it impossible adequately
to fulfill the obligations of either.

Territorial governors

themselves were aware of the contradiction.
bodies pointed out the difficulties as well.

Investigating
This explains

why even conscientious territorial governors failed to meet
their responsibilities as superintendent of Indian affairs.
In part, the inactivity of Montana's Territorial
Governors in Indian affairs may have reflected the time at
which Montana became a Territory.

The Doolittle

Commission's report criticizing the practice of having
territorial governors serve as Indian superintendents came
less than four years after the establishment of the Montana
Territory.

The following year, President Johnson's policy

had replaced most of the civilian Indian agents with
military men.

Montana's Territorial Governors foresaw their

eventual removal from Indian affairs.
This change represented part of a larger shift away
from local control of Indian affairs and toward a
centralized policy made by the federal government.

Even

when Grant replaced military Indian agents with people
affiliated with religious organizations, the control of
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Indian affairs remained with the national government.

Once

again, this occurred just after Montana was organized as a
territory.

Therefore, even as they took up the job of ex-

officio superintendent of Indian affairs, Montana's
territorial governors knew that there authority in that area
was being taken over by the federal government.
The problems, however, ran deeper than changes in
administrative policy could ever solve.

Even the reforms of

the Grant administration failed to address the basic
problem.

The tragedy of United States-Indian relations

transcended any adjustment in administrative practice.
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